Owning the Littorals - My Planning Assumptions

 Owning the Littorals

My Planning Assumptions

Owning the Littorals is a series by BMR on the merits and capabilities of amphibious forces and what I believe their future should be. View the full series here and part two here.

            I love a good fantasy force, you probably love a good fantasy force too, everybody loves a good fantasy force. This includes many people in Main Building, I'm assuming. In this article, I'm going to outline some of the assumptions I've made in planning my own fantasy force, based on the Future Commando Force's own assumptions (assumptions always have to be made). I've tried to consider as many political, social, and strategic consequences as I can think of; however some have probably slipped through the gaps - so feel free to discuss over on Twitter.

Assumption One - The Army

            The first assumption I've made is that all Army supports to the Commando Brigade will remain at the same or similar levels - both of manning and equipment (although I will very much be making allowances for upgrading some equipment available to the Littoral Strike Groups). This is justified, in an army increasingly stretched for manpower, by the fact that the LSGs will act as a 'plug and play' out of area HQ unit - so army operations will be directly supported by their own supports.

            Number-crunching wise, I'm going of the assumption that the Commando Logistic Regiment has about 200 Commando-trained Army personnel under it's command (further breaking down, I'm going off a 50/50 RLC/REME split), 24 Commando, RE has approximately 492 Gunners under it's command and 29 Commando, RA has 430 Army personnel under it's command (my assumptions are 390 RA, 20 REME and 20 RLC. 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) has either one or two Commando EOD troops (sources contradict each other here) under it's command - approximately 50 personnel, all trades.

            The final and biggest assumption on the part of the Army is that the North/South split is going to be embraced across Defence - primarily in the Army. This probably deserves it's own stand alone article but in brief 11 Brigade would be lose the Security Force Assistance role (with no replacement) and 11 and 4 Brigades would support the North/South split. These would use forward deployed troops (Cyprus in the North and Brunei, Oman in the South) to provide acclimatised presence wherever needed. These could also be deployed at sea with the LSGs to provide a larger force if needed - similar to the Australian approach.

Assumption Two - The Navy

            For amphibious operations, amphibious shipping is a prerequisite (unless we're invading the Isle of Wight). Currently, this is the two Albion class (although one is in extended readiness), three Bay class and RFA Argus. The longer term plan is that all six of these are to be replaced by a singular 'Multi-Role Support Ship'. Also planned to be in service by the middle of next decade (although in early design stages), is (up to) five Type 32 frigates.

            Completely unrelated, is the procurement of four Logistics Support Vessels to support the new ARCIMS unmanned Mine Counter Measure vessels. Without going into too much detail, I would reduce the number of (Royal Navy crewed) MRSS to four and use the savings to buy four much larger, much more useful Logistics Support Vessels (which would have use in amphibious landings). 

Assumption Three - The Air Force

            The RAF Regiment provides an unknown (to me) number of Tactical Air Control Parties, which would presumably remain the same. But because I need to bulk out this section more than a line and a half, I'm going to include Joint Helicopter Command here as well.

            I'm making several rather bold assumptions; the boldest being that the Treasury will allow the Fleet Air Arm to buy a tilt-rotor aircraft (presumably not Osprey). They have a price tag (and quite a big one at that) but a tilt-rotor aircraft would give the Queen Elizabeth class the ability to operate fixed wing AWACS and COD capabilities - freeing up most of the Merlin Mk.2 for ASW and the Mk.4 for Commando operations. Yes, it would be expensive, but more expensive than a £3 billion Aircraft Carrier and 900 Sailors? This means 16 Merlins would be available to the LSGs, along with four Commando Wildcats and around 14 Naval Wildcats.

            I'm also going to take forward basing to the extreme, a little bit, and assume that the Army can forward base a not insignificant aviation element East of Suez (Brunei would make sense, working from the already existing AAC airfields). This would aid in both Commando and Army operations. A notional Army contribution to the CHF would consist of 12 Apache and 12 Chinook Attack and heavy lift helicopters.

Assumption Four - Terminology and TLAs

            All the literature available online about the Future Commando Force (or FCF) is filled with absolute mountains of TLAs and TLA(B)s. From what I can work out the standard building block is due to be the Littoral Response Group (LRG), North or South (LRG[N] or LRG[S]). Each is made up of one Littoral Strike Unit (LSU) made up from a Commando Strike Company (CSC) from 40 or 45 Commando, along with supporting elements from across the rest of the Commando Brigade and is supported by a naval force made up of either HMS Albion or RFA Argus (in the North or South, respectively), a Bay class LSD, at least one surface escort and a logistics vessel(s).

            When both LRGs combine for larger operations, they form a Littoral Strike Group (LSG) and when this is complemented by one of both of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, this creates an Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF).

Assumption Five - Allied interoperability

            The Royal Marines have traditionally maintained very close working relationships with allied Marines, most notably the USMC and Royal Netherlands Marines Corps. I'm making the assumptions that this will continue and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps will also change to follow a similar structure to the LRGs, perhaps based off of the Rotterdam class (or their successor, perhaps a chance for international shipbuilding design co-ordination)?

            Working with the USMC would certainly continue, although similarities are obviously much less obvious than with the Netherlands. Interoperability would therefore have to be based on mutually supporting each other and working to each forces' advantages. Also important to note is that the Australian Defence Force have recently improved their amphibious force significantly, perhaps their is scope for working together - what with AUKUS and all that.

Appendix One - My Planning numbers (Personnel)

            My planning numbers, which I have tried not to exceed at all during my thought exercise, are as follows - although this needs to be taken with a full shaker of salt, number denoted with an e rough estimates, based entirely on educated guesswork and (00+00) corresponds to regular and reserves respectively:

-Royal Marines Total Strength: 6,650 (5,968+682)

-Royal Marines Total (including attached Army units): 7644 (7531+113)

-Royal Marines General Duties (Infantry) Officers: 58

-Royal Marines General Duties (Infantry) Other Ranks: 551

-Royal Marines General Duties (Board and Search) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Board and Search) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Support, Augment, Liaise and Train) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Support, Augment, Liaise and Train) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Joint Personnel Recovery) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Joint Personnel Recovery) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Force Protection) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Force Protection) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Nuclear Force Protection) Officers: 30

-Royal Marines General Duties (Nuclear Force Protection) Other Ranks: 520

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Anti-Tank) Officers: 4

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Anti-Tank) Other Ranks: 39

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Air Defence) Officers: 1

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Air Defence) Other Ranks: 35

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Mortars) Officers: 2

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Mortars) Other Ranks: 88

-Royal Artillery Commando Officers: 20 

-Royal Artillery Commando Other Ranks: 410

-Royal Artillery Commando Fire Support Team (All Ranks): 48

-Royal Marines Communications Officers: 8

-Royal Marines Communication Other Ranks: 78e

-Royal Marines Assault Engineer Other Ranks: 48e

-Royal Engineers Commando Officers: 25 (20+5)

-Royal Engineers Commando Other Ranks: 472 (412+60)

-Royal Marines Armoured Support Officers: 15

-Royal Marines Armoured Support Other Ranks: 250

-Royal Marines Combat Intelligence Officers: 5

-Royal Marines Combat Intelligence Other Ranks: 19e

-Royal Marines Landing Craft Crewman Officers: 8

Royal Marines Landing Craft Crewman Other Ranks: 120

-Royal Marines Logistics Officers: 12

-Royal Marines Logistics Other Ranks: 130e

-Royal Marines Communications Exploitation Officers: 4

-Royal Marines Communications Exploitation Other Ranks: 18e

-Royal Marines Information Systems Officers: 3

-Royal Marines Information Systems Other Ranks: 17e

-Royal Marines Police Officers: 1

-Royal Marines Police Other Ranks: 34e

-Royal Marines Sniper Other Ranks: 75e

-Brigade Patrol Troop Other Ranks: 24

Appendix Two: My Planning Numbers (Vehicles, Watercraft, and Aircraft)

            My planning numbers, which I have tried not to exceed at all during my thought exercise, are as follows - although this needs to be taken with a full shaker of salt, number denoted with an e rough estimates, based entirely on educated guesswork:

-16 Merlin Mk. 4 available to the CHF, with more in reserve and repair

-8 Wildcat AH1 Light Attack Helicopters, four need to be acquired from Army stocks

-8 Wildcat HM2 Naval Utility Helicopters, with more available to the wider fleet

-12 Chinook, based and training alongside Littoral Response Groups, although prolonged shipborne deployment should be avoided

-12 Apache AH-64E, naval deployments have been accomplished in Libyan operations, 6 forward deployed with LRG(S) could operate with Army and partner forces across the Indo-Pacific

-4 Littoral Strike Ships, with two based in each area of responsibility - have accommodation for a significant amount of marines, stores and equipment (with ability to RAS with escorts), a dock, large flight deck and hanger

-4 Logistics Support Vessels, based on a commercial conversion with a flight deck, steel beach, large crane, cargo decks, workshop and At-Sea Transfer of stores capability (think of the US Expeditionary Transfer Dock on Meth)

-12 Landing Craft Utility replacements, with the capability to transport an MBT, and transfer fuel and solid stores to smaller craft - as well as a winching deck which can also land and operate medium sized RPAS

-36 Novel Amphibious Craft, to replace both the LCVP and ORC - with the ability to transport a troop of Marines and some light vehicle types

- 12 Landing Craft Air Cushion, hovercraft with the ability to carry a Viking or Coyote and several dozen Marines, like the British built Griffon 8100TD

-6 Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicles, using an Ajax chassis could help get rid of some of them while providing commonality the Hippo severely lacks

-110 Viking ATV(P), to provide both Royal Marines and British Army units with littoral armoured mobility.

-Various Jackal/Coyote and Polaris MRZR to provide high speed mobility to small teams of Commandos

Appendix Three- My Commando Force Operational Concepts

            The Commando Force would be tailored to meet several different operational levels, with a small force available at all times but large scale amphibious operations would need some level of warning for a force package to be assembled. These 'force packages' would consist of a enduring, reinforced,  Contingency and Warfighting.

Enduring - R0 (deployed or deploying) with ~400 Marines available in each area of operations, for use in humanitarian aid, non-combatant evacuation, small-scale raiding, special forces support

Reinforced - R3 (10 days notice to move) with ~800 Marines and a motorised Battlegroup for very small scale theatre entry or raiding operations.

Contingency - R4 (20 days notice to move) with ~1600 Marines and two motorised Battlegroups, with two Mechanised/Armoured Battlegroups and a Brigade HQ preparing for transport on chartered shipping.

Warfighting - R5 (30 days notice to move) with ~2600 Marines, a motorised Brigade and a Mechanised/Armoured Brigade ready to reinforce on chartered shipping for very large scale theatre entry operations.

            The enduring force package should be met in both areas of operation the vast majority of the time,  the reinforced package should be able to be deployed in both around half of the time and the contingency and Warfighting packages are a 'one-shot' deployment -in a singular area of operations, probably with both aircraft carriers, and significant allied forces.

In Part Four, We'll begin discussing a tentative Order Of Battle for the Future Commando Force at the highest levels.

         

Owning The Littorals - What's a Future Commando?

Owning the Littorals

What's a Future Commando?

Owning the Littorals is a series by BMR on the merits and capabilities of amphibious forces and what I believe their future should be. View the full series here and part one here.

 

           Over the past 20 years or so, the Royal Marines have found themselves utilised more and more as a plain old light role infantry brigade, taking their turn to deploy on OP Telic and OP Herrick just as much (if not more) than the Army's Brigades. However, with the return to contingency after the conclusion of combat operations in Afghanistan, it was decided that the illusion of a brigade-level amphibious assault should be dropped in favour of a focus on smaller unit tactics and raiding.

Landlocked Marines

            This began with experimentation using a company of 43 Commando exercising and wargaming in the UK, US, Gibraltar and Cyprus. The purpose of these was not to thrash the Yanks (which didn't happen) as the tabloids reported, but to try and experiment with how these small unit tactics could affect the battle at higher echelons - it was more fact finding than preparing for any imminent operation.

            The Vanguard Strike Company, as it was known, was given lots of leeway to trial and test out all sorts of tactics, small unit structures and equipment, begged borrowed and quite probably stolen from anywhere they could get their hands on. Some of the changes so far are slightly superficial; the adoption of a new uniform, for example, and the White Ensign being worn in the place of the Union Flag - although all these changes seem to be trying to bolster the additional emphasis on the Marines' naval role.

C8 and a Green Ensign

            Some changes have not been so superficial though, Vanguard Company have been experimenting with Unmanned Vehicles and loitering munitions (with the Switchblade 300 and 600 reportedly now being in service with the wider Corps) as well as new vehicles, like the allyest of ally wagons - the Polaris MRZR now spreading across the armed forces like an STI.

Can't carry much, but ally as fuck

            Most of these changes are intended to reflect upon the Corps' primary role as naval infantry, coming from the sea and melting back into it as soon as they arrived, and illustrating the point that their role is not to deliver massive forces across the shore but to land small groups of elite forces in dispersed spots across a coastline.

            These forces could accomplish a wide range of operations, from gathering intelligence, targeting enemy headquarters' with small raids to seizing and holding port facilities to allow heavier forces to disembark.

            To accomplish this, the traditional 30 man troop is being replaced by a much smaller 12 man Commando Strike Team, lacking an officer, instead being commanded by a Sergeant. Now - ignoring the obvious parallels with the US Marines micro-platoon, beefy little squad - 12 is a very nice number to work with.

            As any of you who learnt your times tables in primary school know, two sixes, three fours, four threes and six twos all equal twelve, taking a two man command element (commander and signaller) two five man teams could be organised.

            Now look at the Commando Forces' vehicles; the Wildcat carries six passengers, the Offshore Raiding Craft - eight, the Land Rover Wolf (if it's still going) six. Six Marines is half a troop, meaning two Wildcat's can deliver a troop - or three could deliver a troop and a couple of add-ons with a gunner in each. 

            It's a similar story with the ORC, a new programme to upgrade the thirty-nine strong fleet is underway - the upgraded model is going to be painted grey instead of the existing green (suggesting a bigger focus further out to sea) and known as the Commando Raiding Craft.

ORC10, the CRC prototype

            Upgrades seem to include standardising on a forward console (instead of having forward, centre and rear consoles) for the crew, increase the crew habitability and temperature control as much as possible in an open vehicle, upgrade the armour and weapons fit, install a Raymarine Quantum CHIRP navigation radar and a new removable transom for carrying the Commando Inflatable Craft (which has replaced the Zodiac).

            It is intended that two CRC's are to support a single Commando Strike Team, with fire and mobility support. For that purpose, all CRC's have mounts to fit either a GPMG or HMG on the port and starboard sides to the aft and a single GPMG mount (intended to be left empty in high sea states and long transits - the planning range is up to 150 nautical miles).

            The Royal Marines have acknowledged that this arrangement is sub-optimal - and that one Strike Team should travel in one boat. The Globe And Laurel article which discloses most of this information makes repeated reference to a new boat which 'is already being designed' to replace both the ORC/CRC and the Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel - due to be in service around the 2025 mark.

For illustrative purposes only, CB90 can't carry MRZRs

            This aligns nicely with a request for information put out by the Defence and Security Accelerator for a 'novel amphibious craft' able to

• travel at sustained high speeds (at least 25kts) over a long range (up to 350 nautical miles) in Sea State 2
• provide the ability to deliver personnel and light vehicles to a coastal access point with limited or no impact on operational speed/capability
• relaunch and return from the coastal access point
• operate with a low signature across all spectrums (thermal, radar, visual, acoustic, etc)  to reduce the probability of detection

            It needs to be able to do this with four crew (2 drivers, 1 coxwain, and a load master) while being configurable:

• to carry and deliver up to 24 embarked persons and 4 crew fit to fight (considerations should be given to the environmental impacts on personnel and equipment)
• to carry and secure 2x Light Vehicles and six embarked persons and boat crew (consider for calculations a Polaris MRZR(D). Each vehicle being approximately 3.56m long, 1.86m high, 1.51m wide, Curb weight 953 kg, Payload capacity 680kg.)
• to carry and secure 2x Inflatable Craft and 2x Outboard Motors (OBMs) plus 14 embarked persons and 4 boat crew. (Consider for calculations an inflatable length 5.0m, width 2.08m, height 0.9m, weight 145 kg, Consider a 50hp OBM of 75kg).

            This all adds up to being an MOD attempt to see what information they can gain about the potential CRC/LCVP replacement. It seems logical that the Royal Marines would want to replace the ageing LCVP with something that could transport troops at much higher speed, and in much greater comfort than was previously achievable.

            The primary downside I can see to this approach is the loss of the LCVP's other role - namely V for vehicle. However, after the Snatch situation in the early 2000's, most vehicles have been getting bigger and bigger so the ability to transport even the lightest of the bunch is getting less and less useful - above the likes of the MRZR and Skidoo sit Jackal, which I've never seen in an LCVP.

            Assuming, however, the compartment for the two MRZRs is 7.5m long, 1.8m wide and 1.85m tall (which seems like a probable size needed to quickly manoeuvre out of) then seven NATO standard pallets could be accommodated inside the boat.

            We can also see the new 12 man centric theory at work again - each boat could carry two Strike Teams, Half a Strike Team on MRZRs or a Strike Team and two more Marines to operate the Commando Inflatable Craft.

            Another innovation of the Future Commando Force is the use of drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Uncrewed Air Systems or whatever we're calling them this week. (I'm going with Unmanned Systems, or the RAF's RPAS initialism - and I'm dying on this hill).

            Although not only a Commando Force innovation, small RPAS are featuring heavily in basically everything the Royals are doing, in use for practically anything - from improving situational awareness at the section level to blowing stuff up.

            The RPAS are complemented by the Android Team Awareness Kit (or iPad, to you and me) allowing commanders at the lowest level to improve situational awareness, whether by linking to data feeds and live imagery from his own organic man-portable RPAS or receiving images from higher level reconnaissance assets.

            These include several different types ranging from the Anduril Ghost, a man portable design, all the way up to the G3 Systems designed Heavy Lift UAV. The Ghost has a maximum flight time of 55 minutes, can be readied for operation by a single operator in three minutes, is capable of operationg near-autonomously in swarms and is practically silent.

            The Heavy Lift UAV was procured under the PODS umbrella, meaning that everything needed to operate the system, and the system itself, is contained in a 20 foot ISO container - improving deployability greatly. (As an aside, sticking one on the River class OPV in the Caribbean would probably help in hurricane season.) 

Drone in a box

            Having the ability to carry relatively large payloads will significantly aid the Commando Forces' ability to transport heavy equipment without having to drag it around - and the ability to transport a casualty is interesting, to say the least.

            It is also known that Switchblade loitering munitions are in service with the corps, but not to what extent.

            

             Switchblade 300 is a small (about two foot) loitering munition which can be transported and operated by a single soldier - the whole system weighs less than 3 kg. It has a maximum range of 10kg and a ten minute loiter time. Handily, it is controlled by a ground control system identical to that of the Puma UAV (also in RM service), and both platforms can theoretically be controlled by the same station simultaneously. The explosive is roughly equivalent to a 40mm grenade, and has been air launched from a USMC Osprey - perhaps this could be a useful addition to the Wildcat (in army service as well).

Just like the mortar, innit?

            It's big brother, the Switchblade 600, weighs significantly more - the full system being over 50kg - but can be assembled in less than ten minutes, and breaks down to technically man portable levels (although the man porting it would probably disagree). It has a maximum range of 80 km (although relay stations need to be utilised to achieve this) and a 20 minute loiter time at 40 km - the punch is a similar warhead to that found on a Javelin ATGM, giving indirect anti-tank capabilities to the Marines.

            More unmanned systems are either in service or soon to be in service but, like much of the FCF programme, not much is known and press releases are very limited.

            In the next part of this article, we're going to discuss what I think the Commando force can and should provide at readiness for amphibious raiding, assaults, exercises and disaster relief.