Owning the Littorals - An Introduction

 Owning the Littorals

An introduction

This is part one of a series based around the capability and future of the Future Commando Force. For the full series, click here, for part two, click here

            Several months ago, I wrote a piece about my thoughts on future amphibious forces. In this article, I make a number of assumptions about the future of the amphibious force, most of which meant an increase in spending would be needed. Since I wrote that article, it has become clear that an uplift in defence spending to any significant level is more and more unlikely, and if it is to come than amphibious forces should probably not be the first priority to see that money. In this series of articles, I'm going to discuss some of the ideas and concepts around the Future Commando Force but first, why are amphibious forces needed?

            The first reason I believe that amphibious forces are important is to preserve a fully sovereign capability for the British Government to project power overseas. While Carrier Strike is obviously an important part of overseas power projection, airstrikes alone (or even in tandem with naval strikes) cannot win a war alone. A modern example of this would be the First Libyan Civil War in 2011, where NATO (and international) forces enforced a no-fly zone and performed airstrikes on Colonel Gaddafi's government forces - but no NATO ground forces were deployed (except a few special forces and personnel recovery teams). The lack of forces to engage government forces in support of the rebels is potentially one of the many factors that the Libyan Crisis is still ongoing, although a ceasefire is in place. If amphibious forces had been deployed and fully utilised then there is potential that the situation in Libya may well have turned out very different.
 

           On the contrary, it could be argued that amphibious forces should not be prioritised in budget and manpower distribution because the Armed Forces need to focus their main effort on other capabilities; namely armoured forces to fight Russians on the Eastern Flank. The need to protect Eastern NATO members has obviously returned to the forefront after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and so it could be argued that more money should be going towards IFVs or more MBTs instead of the ability to take beaches. Obviously NATO commitments are very important so might take precedence over any other commitments and capabilities, including the amphibious force.
 

           However, I believe that Russia is an ever diminishing threat. This can be seen in Ukraine (a second rate power at best) where 'elite' Russian troops seem to regularly be beaten by Ukrainian forces, many of whom have little training and no allies (on the ground) - although some modern western equipment is being used to great effect. Now imagine that modern western equipment is used by troops who've trained and operated them for years - knowing every trick and little nuance of their systems - Russian forces would be decimated (at least) by our continental NATO allies; the Polish, French and maybe even the Germans. President Putin knows this, the only way Russia remains a threat is through their possession and probably will to use nuclear weapons. The best way British forces can contribute to deterring Russia is the same way we have been deterring Russia for the past 53 years - the continuous at sea deterrent.
 

           Britain's biggest conventional threats are probably more likely to be Iran, Chinese expansion in Africa, and North Korea - Kim's never ending attempts at being the most evil man on the planet have been beaten by Putin's special military operation - although his missile tests and 'drone strikes' (or remote control aeroplane, take your pick) seem to be trying to claim back his title. China are expanding their soft power and power projection capabilities in South America and Africa, notably for British Forces, they seem to have a new friend in Argentina. Therefore it would make sense if we prioritised the ability to deploy around the world - and especially in Africa and South America - in support of our allies to train, mentor and defeat insurgencies. (This is a topic worthy of a several volume academic book, and one which desperately needs joined up thinking™  between government departments.)
 

           The final reason I believe that amphibious forces need investment is because of their utility in other tasks. An amphibious warship has masses of space in a vehicle deck, intended for vehicles (obviously!) but that can reconfigured for basically anything, from disaster relief to special forces infiltration, to basic logistics and as a flagship for a task force. This inherent flexibility means that amphibious forces are some of the most hardworking ships of the naval force; the Bay class quite often have two out of three deployed in the Gulf and Caribbean for long stretches of time. To get rid of these would be a major set back in the UK's soft power as well as any offensive capability loss.
 

           Those are the reasons I believe that amphibious forces are an important part of a modern balanced fleet, in part two of this series I'll discuss some of the concepts and theories of the new Future Commando Force.

Read Part Two here.