Owning the Littorals
My Planning Assumptions
I love a good fantasy force, you probably love a good fantasy force too, everybody loves a good fantasy force. This includes many people in Main Building, I'm assuming. In this article, I'm going to outline some of the assumptions I've made in planning my own fantasy force, based on the Future Commando Force's own assumptions (assumptions always have to be made). I've tried to consider as many political, social, and strategic consequences as I can think of; however some have probably slipped through the gaps - so feel free to discuss over on Twitter.
Assumption One - The Army
The first assumption I've made is that all Army supports to the Commando Brigade will remain at the same or similar levels - both of manning and equipment (although I will very much be making allowances for upgrading some equipment available to the Littoral Strike Groups). This is justified, in an army increasingly stretched for manpower, by the fact that the LSGs will act as a 'plug and play' out of area HQ unit - so army operations will be directly supported by their own supports.
Number-crunching wise, I'm going of the assumption that the Commando Logistic Regiment has about 200 Commando-trained Army personnel under it's command (further breaking down, I'm going off a 50/50 RLC/REME split), 24 Commando, RE has approximately 492 Gunners under it's command and 29 Commando, RA has 430 Army personnel under it's command (my assumptions are 390 RA, 20 REME and 20 RLC. 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) has either one or two Commando EOD troops (sources contradict each other here) under it's command - approximately 50 personnel, all trades.
The final and biggest assumption on the part of the Army is that the North/South split is going to be embraced across Defence - primarily in the Army. This probably deserves it's own stand alone article but in brief 11 Brigade would be lose the Security Force Assistance role (with no replacement) and 11 and 4 Brigades would support the North/South split. These would use forward deployed troops (Cyprus in the North and Brunei, Oman in the South) to provide acclimatised presence wherever needed. These could also be deployed at sea with the LSGs to provide a larger force if needed - similar to the Australian approach.
Assumption Two - The Navy
For amphibious operations, amphibious shipping is a prerequisite (unless we're invading the Isle of Wight). Currently, this is the two Albion class (although one is in extended readiness), three Bay class and RFA Argus. The longer term plan is that all six of these are to be replaced by a singular 'Multi-Role Support Ship'. Also planned to be in service by the middle of next decade (although in early design stages), is (up to) five Type 32 frigates.
Completely unrelated, is the procurement of four Logistics Support Vessels to support the new ARCIMS unmanned Mine Counter Measure vessels. Without going into too much detail, I would reduce the number of (Royal Navy crewed) MRSS to four and use the savings to buy four much larger, much more useful Logistics Support Vessels (which would have use in amphibious landings).
Assumption Three - The Air Force
The RAF Regiment provides an unknown (to me) number of Tactical Air Control Parties, which would presumably remain the same. But because I need to bulk out this section more than a line and a half, I'm going to include Joint Helicopter Command here as well.
I'm making several rather bold assumptions; the boldest being that the Treasury will allow the Fleet Air Arm to buy a tilt-rotor aircraft (presumably not Osprey). They have a price tag (and quite a big one at that) but a tilt-rotor aircraft would give the Queen Elizabeth class the ability to operate fixed wing AWACS and COD capabilities - freeing up most of the Merlin Mk.2 for ASW and the Mk.4 for Commando operations. Yes, it would be expensive, but more expensive than a £3 billion Aircraft Carrier and 900 Sailors? This means 16 Merlins would be available to the LSGs, along with four Commando Wildcats and around 14 Naval Wildcats.
I'm also going to take forward basing to the extreme, a little bit, and assume that the Army can forward base a not insignificant aviation element East of Suez (Brunei would make sense, working from the already existing AAC airfields). This would aid in both Commando and Army operations. A notional Army contribution to the CHF would consist of 12 Apache and 12 Chinook Attack and heavy lift helicopters.
Assumption Four - Terminology and TLAs
All the literature available online about the Future Commando Force (or FCF) is filled with absolute mountains of TLAs and TLA(B)s. From what I can work out the standard building block is due to be the Littoral Response Group (LRG), North or South (LRG[N] or LRG[S]). Each is made up of one Littoral Strike Unit (LSU) made up from a Commando Strike Company (CSC) from 40 or 45 Commando, along with supporting elements from across the rest of the Commando Brigade and is supported by a naval force made up of either HMS Albion or RFA Argus (in the North or South, respectively), a Bay class LSD, at least one surface escort and a logistics vessel(s).
When both LRGs combine for larger operations, they form a Littoral Strike Group (LSG) and when this is complemented by one of both of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, this creates an Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF).
Assumption Five - Allied interoperability
The Royal Marines have traditionally maintained very close working relationships with allied Marines, most notably the USMC and Royal Netherlands Marines Corps. I'm making the assumptions that this will continue and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps will also change to follow a similar structure to the LRGs, perhaps based off of the Rotterdam class (or their successor, perhaps a chance for international shipbuilding design co-ordination)?
Working with the USMC would certainly continue, although similarities are obviously much less obvious than with the Netherlands. Interoperability would therefore have to be based on mutually supporting each other and working to each forces' advantages. Also important to note is that the Australian Defence Force have recently improved their amphibious force significantly, perhaps their is scope for working together - what with AUKUS and all that.
Appendix One - My Planning numbers (Personnel)
My planning numbers, which I have tried not to exceed at all during my thought exercise, are as follows - although this needs to be taken with a full shaker of salt, number denoted with an e rough estimates, based entirely on educated guesswork and (00+00) corresponds to regular and reserves respectively:
-Royal Marines Total Strength: 6,650 (5,968+682)
-Royal Marines Total (including attached Army units): 7644 (7531+113)
-Royal Marines General Duties (Infantry) Officers: 58
-Royal Marines General Duties (Infantry) Other Ranks: 551
-Royal Marines General Duties (Board and Search) Officers: 5
-Royal Marines General Duties (Board and Search) Other Ranks: 75e
-Royal Marines General Duties (Support, Augment, Liaise and Train) Officers: 5
-Royal Marines General Duties (Support, Augment, Liaise and Train) Other Ranks: 75e
-Royal Marines General Duties (Joint Personnel Recovery) Officers: 5
-Royal Marines General Duties (Joint Personnel Recovery) Other Ranks: 75e
-Royal Marines General Duties (Force Protection) Officers: 5
-Royal Marines General Duties (Force Protection) Other Ranks: 75e
-Royal Marines General Duties (Nuclear Force Protection) Officers: 30
-Royal Marines General Duties (Nuclear Force Protection) Other Ranks: 520
-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Anti-Tank) Officers: 4
-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Anti-Tank) Other Ranks: 39
-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Air Defence) Officers: 1
-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Air Defence) Other Ranks: 35
-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Mortars) Officers: 2
-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Mortars) Other Ranks: 88
-Royal Artillery Commando Officers: 20
-Royal Artillery Commando Other Ranks: 410
-Royal Artillery Commando Fire Support Team (All Ranks): 48
-Royal Marines Communications Officers: 8
-Royal Marines Communication Other Ranks: 78e
-Royal Marines Assault Engineer Other Ranks: 48e
-Royal Engineers Commando Officers: 25 (20+5)
-Royal Engineers Commando Other Ranks: 472 (412+60)
-Royal Marines Armoured Support Officers: 15
-Royal Marines Armoured Support Other Ranks: 250
-Royal Marines Combat Intelligence Officers: 5
-Royal Marines Combat Intelligence Other Ranks: 19e
-Royal Marines Landing Craft Crewman Officers: 8
Royal Marines Landing Craft Crewman Other Ranks: 120
-Royal Marines Logistics Officers: 12
-Royal Marines Logistics Other Ranks: 130e
-Royal Marines Communications Exploitation Officers: 4
-Royal Marines Communications Exploitation Other Ranks: 18e
-Royal Marines Information Systems Officers: 3
-Royal Marines Information Systems Other Ranks: 17e
-Royal Marines Police Officers: 1
-Royal Marines Police Other Ranks: 34e
-Royal Marines Sniper Other Ranks: 75e
-Brigade Patrol Troop Other Ranks: 24
Appendix Two: My Planning Numbers (Vehicles, Watercraft, and Aircraft)
My planning numbers, which I have tried not to exceed at all during my thought exercise, are as follows - although this needs to be taken with a full shaker of salt, number denoted with an e rough estimates, based entirely on educated guesswork:
-16 Merlin Mk. 4 available to the CHF, with more in reserve and repair
-8 Wildcat AH1 Light Attack Helicopters, four need to be acquired from Army stocks
-8 Wildcat HM2 Naval Utility Helicopters, with more available to the wider fleet
-12 Chinook, based and training alongside Littoral Response Groups, although prolonged shipborne deployment should be avoided
-12 Apache AH-64E, naval deployments have been accomplished in Libyan operations, 6 forward deployed with LRG(S) could operate with Army and partner forces across the Indo-Pacific
-4 Littoral Strike Ships, with two based in each area of responsibility - have accommodation for a significant amount of marines, stores and equipment (with ability to RAS with escorts), a dock, large flight deck and hanger
-4 Logistics Support Vessels, based on a commercial conversion with a flight deck, steel beach, large crane, cargo decks, workshop and At-Sea Transfer of stores capability (think of the US Expeditionary Transfer Dock on Meth)
-12 Landing Craft Utility replacements, with the capability to transport an MBT, and transfer fuel and solid stores to smaller craft - as well as a winching deck which can also land and operate medium sized RPAS
-36 Novel Amphibious Craft, to replace both the LCVP and ORC - with the ability to transport a troop of Marines and some light vehicle types
- 12 Landing Craft Air Cushion, hovercraft with the ability to carry a Viking or Coyote and several dozen Marines, like the British built Griffon 8100TD
-6 Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicles, using an Ajax chassis could help get rid of some of them while providing commonality the Hippo severely lacks
-110 Viking ATV(P), to provide both Royal Marines and British Army units with littoral armoured mobility.
-Various Jackal/Coyote and Polaris MRZR to provide high speed mobility to small teams of Commandos
Appendix Three- My Commando Force Operational Concepts
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