06 June 2023

Make Do And Mend

 Make Do And Mend

An Introduction



           Ajax is a name almost synonymous with everything wrong with defence procurement in the modern government, probably one of the longest, most reported on and costly cock-ups the MOD has ever seen. Due to a massive amount of engineering defects - not least the fact that personnel involved in the trials are now partially deaf - it was up in the air whether General Dynamics would actually be able to get the vehicle into service but a series of positive press releases seem to be suggesting the worst of the vibration issues have been overcome.



            With the billions sunk into the project, and the unfortunate likelihood of war in Europe within the next decade, Ajax is needed.

            But a rather large reconnaissance vehicle isn't all that's needed; wholesale change within the Army is required to bring the Army back into the modern era. A strategic plan needs to be formed, optimised but not completely focused around the Russian thread.

            This would require a force that can fight across most of the spectrum of warfare, from farmers in flip-flops to full peer-on-peer combat. This means we can't afford to look solely at one threat, and that any force needs to be expeditionary by design - basically the only certainty in this context is that we won't be fighting in Great Britain.

            With this in mind, we can construct our force around a few main trends and points, using trends from conflicts past and ongoing and various studies notably Colonel D. Macgregor, US. Army (ret)'s Reconnaissance Strike GroupConceptual Force 2035 and various organisational structures from allied (and other) armies around the world. This leaves us with a few key takeaways, namely:

  • Long Range Indirect Fires integrated at all levels of the Conceptual Force, from Mortars and Non Line Of Sight Short Range Missiles at Company level to Precision Strike at Divisional Level - allowing destruction of enemy positions without significant infantry assaults needed.
  • Significant use of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, in every cavalry troop and infantry platoon - both mounted and dismounted, direct and indirect, reusable and disposable variants. 
  • Integral Reconnaissance assets at Battlegroup, Brigade and Divisional Levels, using both covert, small teams and systems and full-scale fighting for information - with various weapons types up to MBTs.
  • Remotely Crewed Systems for both reconnaissance and strike, integrated at all levels (noticing any patterns here) and adding extra levels to the Conceptual Forces' situational awareness.
  • More and meaningful co-operation with allied forces, culminating with a British heavy division operating within an allied Corps.

            Any future force needs to be able to act and respond to any threats that could come about across the medium to long term (I'm defining medium as about 5-7 years and long as 7+) while not ignoring the Bear in the room, so to speak. I would suggest that, to that end, the army focus' right now on maintaining a singular hard as nails armoured Brigade, with the intention of expanding over the medium term. The force should then aspire to maintain several levels of operation, either:
  • One Armoured Division, either as part of a UK-led, mainly UK operation or as part of an Allied Corps, as a one shot deployment.
  • One Armoured/Mechanised Brigade as part of a wider Allied formation, contributing a Divisional HQ and specialised troops occasionally, indefinitely as part of a rotational deployment
  • An armoured Battlegroup to a multinational deployment indefinitely as part of an allied operation, while maintaining a presence in Estonia.
            What this means in fighty terms is that the Army should aim to complete an Iraq 91, Iraq 04, or KFOR+Cabrit while maintaining a lighter force for a Falklands style operation at all times.

            What this means in practice is that smaller all-arms formations with masses of indirect fires, able to operate in small Battlegroup sized formations all the way up to Divisional level (as part of a multi-national corps). For this, our tried and tested* (*note - not actually tried and tested, who do you think I am?) plan is going to need several planning assumptions, notably:
  • Any more money that becomes available is going to be spent primarily on upgrading and enhancing already in service or ordered systems, with no new 'big ticket' procurements (that means no CV90, sorry!)
  • The army isn't getting bigger, so plans have to be near enough manpower neutral (or have a reasonable place to steal manpower from)
  • All already ordered platforms need to be used as procured, although small modifications (after initial entry into service) are acceptable
  • For Multi-National operations, interoperability with the allies we expect to work with the most is always a good thing™
  • The Land Industrial Strategy should be kept in mind as far as possible (although promptly ignoring it wouldn't make much of a change)
            Bearing in mind the above, I think that the optimal armoured division would be a relatively large square division, with both wheeled and tracked platforms.

            The wheeled platform would obviously be Boxer, and potentially a cheaper companion, while the tracked platforms would be Ajax, Challenger 3 and eventually it's replacement.

            Overall, the Division should be formed of two armoured, two mechanised, one Deep Reconnaissance & Strike Brigade, an Operational Sustainment Brigade, and a Headquarters and security brigade.

            In this little series of articles, I'm going to outline my thoughts on this structure in quite a bit of detail, but first we're going to discuss the main problem preventing it's implementation: the cap-badge mafia.

01 May 2023

Owning the Littorals - My Planning Assumptions

 Owning the Littorals

My Planning Assumptions


Owning the Littorals is a series by BMR on the merits and capabilities of amphibious forces and what I believe their future should be. View the full series here and part two here.



            I love a good fantasy force, you probably love a good fantasy force too, everybody loves a good fantasy force. This includes many people in Main Building, I'm assuming. In this article, I'm going to outline some of the assumptions I've made in planning my own fantasy force, based on the Future Commando Force's own assumptions (assumptions always have to be made). I've tried to consider as many political, social, and strategic consequences as I can think of; however some have probably slipped through the gaps - so feel free to discuss over on Twitter.


Assumption One - The Army

            The first assumption I've made is that all Army supports to the Commando Brigade will remain at the same or similar levels - both of manning and equipment (although I will very much be making allowances for upgrading some equipment available to the Littoral Strike Groups). This is justified, in an army increasingly stretched for manpower, by the fact that the LSGs will act as a 'plug and play' out of area HQ unit - so army operations will be directly supported by their own supports.

            Number-crunching wise, I'm going of the assumption that the Commando Logistic Regiment has about 200 Commando-trained Army personnel under it's command (further breaking down, I'm going off a 50/50 RLC/REME split), 24 Commando, RE has approximately 492 Gunners under it's command and 29 Commando, RA has 430 Army personnel under it's command (my assumptions are 390 RA, 20 REME and 20 RLC. 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) has either one or two Commando EOD troops (sources contradict each other here) under it's command - approximately 50 personnel, all trades.

            The final and biggest assumption on the part of the Army is that the North/South split is going to be embraced across Defence - primarily in the Army. This probably deserves it's own stand alone article but in brief 11 Brigade would be lose the Security Force Assistance role (with no replacement) and 11 and 4 Brigades would support the North/South split. These would use forward deployed troops (Cyprus in the North and Brunei, Oman in the South) to provide acclimatised presence wherever needed. These could also be deployed at sea with the LSGs to provide a larger force if needed - similar to the Australian approach.


Assumption Two - The Navy

            For amphibious operations, amphibious shipping is a prerequisite (unless we're invading the Isle of Wight). Currently, this is the two Albion class (although one is in extended readiness), three Bay class and RFA Argus. The longer term plan is that all six of these are to be replaced by a singular 'Multi-Role Support Ship'. Also planned to be in service by the middle of next decade (although in early design stages), is (up to) five Type 32 frigates.

            Completely unrelated, is the procurement of four Logistics Support Vessels to support the new ARCIMS unmanned Mine Counter Measure vessels. Without going into too much detail, I would reduce the number of (Royal Navy crewed) MRSS to four and use the savings to buy four much larger, much more useful Logistics Support Vessels (which would have use in amphibious landings). 


Assumption Three - The Air Force

            The RAF Regiment provides an unknown (to me) number of Tactical Air Control Parties, which would presumably remain the same. But because I need to bulk out this section more than a line and a half, I'm going to include Joint Helicopter Command here as well.

            I'm making several rather bold assumptions; the boldest being that the Treasury will allow the Fleet Air Arm to buy a tilt-rotor aircraft (presumably not Osprey). They have a price tag (and quite a big one at that) but a tilt-rotor aircraft would give the Queen Elizabeth class the ability to operate fixed wing AWACS and COD capabilities - freeing up most of the Merlin Mk.2 for ASW and the Mk.4 for Commando operations. Yes, it would be expensive, but more expensive than a £3 billion Aircraft Carrier and 900 Sailors? This means 16 Merlins would be available to the LSGs, along with four Commando Wildcats and around 14 Naval Wildcats.

            I'm also going to take forward basing to the extreme, a little bit, and assume that the Army can forward base a not insignificant aviation element East of Suez (Brunei would make sense, working from the already existing AAC airfields). This would aid in both Commando and Army operations. A notional Army contribution to the CHF would consist of 12 Apache and 12 Chinook Attack and heavy lift helicopters.


Assumption Four - Terminology and TLAs

            All the literature available online about the Future Commando Force (or FCF) is filled with absolute mountains of TLAs and TLA(B)s. From what I can work out the standard building block is due to be the Littoral Response Group (LRG), North or South (LRG[N] or LRG[S]). Each is made up of one Littoral Strike Unit (LSU) made up from a Commando Strike Company (CSC) from 40 or 45 Commando, along with supporting elements from across the rest of the Commando Brigade and is supported by a naval force made up of either HMS Albion or RFA Argus (in the North or South, respectively), a Bay class LSD, at least one surface escort and a logistics vessel(s).

            When both LRGs combine for larger operations, they form a Littoral Strike Group (LSG) and when this is complemented by one of both of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, this creates an Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF).


Assumption Five - Allied interoperability

            The Royal Marines have traditionally maintained very close working relationships with allied Marines, most notably the USMC and Royal Netherlands Marines Corps. I'm making the assumptions that this will continue and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps will also change to follow a similar structure to the LRGs, perhaps based off of the Rotterdam class (or their successor, perhaps a chance for international shipbuilding design co-ordination)?

            Working with the USMC would certainly continue, although similarities are obviously much less obvious than with the Netherlands. Interoperability would therefore have to be based on mutually supporting each other and working to each forces' advantages. Also important to note is that the Australian Defence Force have recently improved their amphibious force significantly, perhaps their is scope for working together - what with AUKUS and all that.


Appendix One - My Planning numbers (Personnel)

            My planning numbers, which I have tried not to exceed at all during my thought exercise, are as follows - although this needs to be taken with a full shaker of salt, number denoted with an e rough estimates, based entirely on educated guesswork and (00+00) corresponds to regular and reserves respectively:

-Royal Marines Total Strength: 6,650 (5,968+682)

-Royal Marines Total (including attached Army units): 7644 (7531+113)

-Royal Marines General Duties (Infantry) Officers: 58

-Royal Marines General Duties (Infantry) Other Ranks: 551

-Royal Marines General Duties (Board and Search) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Board and Search) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Support, Augment, Liaise and Train) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Support, Augment, Liaise and Train) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Joint Personnel Recovery) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Joint Personnel Recovery) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Force Protection) Officers: 5

-Royal Marines General Duties (Force Protection) Other Ranks: 75e

-Royal Marines General Duties (Nuclear Force Protection) Officers: 30

-Royal Marines General Duties (Nuclear Force Protection) Other Ranks: 520

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Anti-Tank) Officers: 4

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Anti-Tank) Other Ranks: 39

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Air Defence) Officers: 1

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Air Defence) Other Ranks: 35

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Mortars) Officers: 2

-Royal Marines Heavy Weapons (Mortars) Other Ranks: 88

-Royal Artillery Commando Officers: 20 

-Royal Artillery Commando Other Ranks: 410

-Royal Artillery Commando Fire Support Team (All Ranks): 48

-Royal Marines Communications Officers: 8

-Royal Marines Communication Other Ranks: 78e

-Royal Marines Assault Engineer Other Ranks: 48e

-Royal Engineers Commando Officers: 25 (20+5)

-Royal Engineers Commando Other Ranks: 472 (412+60)

-Royal Marines Armoured Support Officers: 15

-Royal Marines Armoured Support Other Ranks: 250

-Royal Marines Combat Intelligence Officers: 5

-Royal Marines Combat Intelligence Other Ranks: 19e

-Royal Marines Landing Craft Crewman Officers: 8

Royal Marines Landing Craft Crewman Other Ranks: 120

-Royal Marines Logistics Officers: 12

-Royal Marines Logistics Other Ranks: 130e

-Royal Marines Communications Exploitation Officers: 4

-Royal Marines Communications Exploitation Other Ranks: 18e

-Royal Marines Information Systems Officers: 3

-Royal Marines Information Systems Other Ranks: 17e

-Royal Marines Police Officers: 1

-Royal Marines Police Other Ranks: 34e

-Royal Marines Sniper Other Ranks: 75e

-Brigade Patrol Troop Other Ranks: 24

Appendix Two: My Planning Numbers (Vehicles, Watercraft, and Aircraft)

            My planning numbers, which I have tried not to exceed at all during my thought exercise, are as follows - although this needs to be taken with a full shaker of salt, number denoted with an rough estimates, based entirely on educated guesswork:

-16 Merlin Mk. 4 available to the CHF, with more in reserve and repair

-8 Wildcat AH1 Light Attack Helicopters, four need to be acquired from Army stocks

-8 Wildcat HM2 Naval Utility Helicopters, with more available to the wider fleet

-12 Chinook, based and training alongside Littoral Response Groups, although prolonged shipborne deployment should be avoided

-12 Apache AH-64E, naval deployments have been accomplished in Libyan operations, 6 forward deployed with LRG(S) could operate with Army and partner forces across the Indo-Pacific

-4 Littoral Strike Ships, with two based in each area of responsibility - have accommodation for a significant amount of marines, stores and equipment (with ability to RAS with escorts), a dock, large flight deck and hanger

-4 Logistics Support Vessels, based on a commercial conversion with a flight deck, steel beach, large crane, cargo decks, workshop and At-Sea Transfer of stores capability (think of the US Expeditionary Transfer Dock on Meth)

-12 Landing Craft Utility replacements, with the capability to transport an MBT, and transfer fuel and solid stores to smaller craft - as well as a winching deck which can also land and operate medium sized RPAS

-36 Novel Amphibious Craft, to replace both the LCVP and ORC - with the ability to transport a troop of Marines and some light vehicle types

- 12 Landing Craft Air Cushion, hovercraft with the ability to carry a Viking or Coyote and several dozen Marines, like the British built Griffon 8100TD

-6 Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicles, using an Ajax chassis could help get rid of some of them while providing commonality the Hippo severely lacks

-110 Viking ATV(P), to provide both Royal Marines and British Army units with littoral armoured mobility.

-Various Jackal/Coyote and Polaris MRZR to provide high speed mobility to small teams of Commandos


Appendix Three- My Commando Force Operational Concepts

            The Commando Force would be tailored to meet several different operational levels, with a small force available at all times but large scale amphibious operations would need some level of warning for a force package to be assembled. These 'force packages' would consist of a enduring, reinforced,  Contingency and Warfighting.

Enduring - R0 (deployed or deploying) with ~400 Marines available in each area of operations, for use in humanitarian aid, non-combatant evacuation, small-scale raiding, special forces support

Reinforced - R3 (10 days notice to move) with ~800 Marines and a motorised Battlegroup for very small scale theatre entry or raiding operations.

Contingency - R4 (20 days notice to move) with ~1600 Marines and two motorised Battlegroups, with two Mechanised/Armoured Battlegroups and a Brigade HQ preparing for transport on chartered shipping.

Warfighting - R5 (30 days notice to move) with ~2600 Marines, a motorised Brigade and a Mechanised/Armoured Brigade ready to reinforce on chartered shipping for very large scale theatre entry operations.


            The enduring force package should be met in both areas of operation the vast majority of the time,  the reinforced package should be able to be deployed in both around half of the time and the contingency and Warfighting packages are a 'one-shot' deployment -in a singular area of operations, probably with both aircraft carriers, and significant allied forces.


In Part Four, We'll begin discussing a tentative Order Of Battle for the Future Commando Force at the highest levels.




         

25 February 2023

Joined Up Thinking*

Joined Up Thinking*

*Or lack thereof


            British foreign policy is a mess. Every week there seems to be a different 'emergent threat' which is then duly completely disregarded by every government department, who pursue there own pet projects. This approach to foreign policy is imperfect to say the least - it means that HM Government and UK plc. have no focus, which impacts the economy, national standing and international impacts of our country. In this little article, I'm going to take a look at some of the priorities all government departments should be looking at and how these would affect the Armed Forces.


Priority One - National Resilience

            The war in Ukraine and soaring energy prices have brought the debate about national resilience closer to the front of people's minds, especially with the realisation that onshore (and off our shores too!) energy reduces our reliance on the whims of foreign nations (whether expansionist nutters or just French) and might even save the consumer some money. Personally, I (and probably most of you too) believe that as much as humanly possible should be done to increase national resilience in several critical areas - most notably gas, food, medical equipment and ammunition. 


            With the UK's pivot away from natural gases, and the plan to achieve Net Zero before 2050, it seems almost certain that stocking a massive warehouse full of coal probably isn't the best way to go around this - after all, HM Government loses all credibility to try and get industry to pursue the move from fossil fuels if it is simultaneously filling up a bunker with the shite. 

            Therefore, the government should probably take the short term financial hit and invest in Rolls Royce's Small Modular Reactor concept, currently in the development stage. RR are planning on building significant portions of them in a factory, somewhere in Northern England or Wales (levelling up) and then performing the final assembly on site (SMR estimates that 90% of assembly is under factory conditions). The SMR is around 10% of the size of a conventional nuclear power station, so could potentially physically replace existing infrastructure, and could generate the same amount of power as 160 onshore wind turbines do - enough to power around 225,000 homes (twitter, correct me if my maths is wrong).

SMRs even look good too -trees!

            Small Modular reactors (in concert with larger traditional nuclear reactors) could provide a baseline of electricity, along with Wind Turbines, strategically placed ones can provide significant power (for example, the Orkney Islands could produce enough wind to power a significant proportion of the Scottish Highlands - government investment could make this happen relatively cheaply, by simply upgrading existing cables). Solar and other renewables could provide an extra surge capacity for the five o'clock rush or when the adverts start during Emmerdale. 

            But how could defence help with this, it is obviously a cross-departmental effort. The MOD could start by championing Rolls Royce's expertise of nuclear reactors (indeed, they've been building them for the Navy for nearly three-quarters of a century) and then perhaps even power Salisbury Plain, or Catterick Garrison with one (they could even use these to power the very reliable electric cars they've bought). 


            Food wise,we have absolutely no chance of being able to produce the entire food needs of this country onshore. Even if the entire population survived on a diet consisting entirely of potatoes, carrots, beef and Mr Kiplings' Cherry Bakewells washed down with Iron Brew and Newcastle Brown Ale, it would be doubtful. Indeed, this has long been one of Britains' greatest weaknesses, with both the Kaiser and Hitler seeing starving the population as their best chance at defeating us.

            We should however, try and create a national stockpile of staple foods and other vital supplies (soaps/hygiene products, paracetamol/ibruprofen and baby products, for example) with the aim of holding enough supplies for around three or four months of absolutely no food imports at all. This could potentially be a job for the MOD to run, perhaps using veteran sub-contractors to assist.

            This would be quite expensive to set up however, but the cost could probably be offset quite a bit if a sensible approach was taken to the food packages. If a package consisted of something similar to the current 24 hour ration pack (which has a shelf life of 2 years), then they could be held in storage for a time of crisis for 12 months and then sent out to be used by the Field Army, Cadet Forces or Families in Need at home or abroad. A similar approach could be taken with the non-food items - although the Army probably won't be needing that many nappies. 


            Ammunition availability  is another problem we might come across in wartime, with Ukrainian forces using up significantly more ammunition than NATO has planned for. The MOD needs to seriously increase it's ammunition stocks in every calibre used (although it should be limiting the different types) and should have at least one (but preferably several) onshore manufacturing facility for 5.56 and 7.62 NATO standard small arms ammunition, 81 and 120 mm mortar bombs, 30 and 40 mm Medium calibre (for naval guns), 40mm CTA, 155mm artillery shells and 120mm smoothbore rounds as well as all our favourite guided munitions (say the line everyone). 

            Truth be told, we're not actually that far away from doing all of this. BAE can manufacture 5.56 and 7.62 at a rate of over a million a day and manufacture 81 mm mortar bombs in Washington (the machinery is capable of making 120 mm rounds with minimal re-tooling). CTA is all fine (BAE have even made 100,000 rounds of it - despite the fact that there's not even a cannon capable of firing it in service yet), 20 and 30 mm rounds are manufactured in Monmouthshire and - with the decline of the 20 mm cannon in naval service - it would be advantageous for BAE to establish a 40 and 57 mm line. 155 mm shells are produced onshore, as well, leaving only 120mm smoothbore not being produced. Considering that BAE make ammunition for the Challenger 2's unique 120mm rifled gun, I would assume they will re-tool that line for smoothbore - which also has a much larger export potential. 

            As well as having a large and scalable manufacturing capability, having a large enough stockpile for initial use in a major shooting war is also vital. The MOD stockpiles some amount in the UK however it would take a while to reach the frontlines (and relying on a small amount of facilities is risky, to say the least). It would, therefore, increase fighting power to set up relatively large ammo dumps in the SBA Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, Brunei, Oman, Bahrain and Singapore.


Priority Two - Foreign Aid

            Foreign Aid is the department of choice for defence commentators and right wing news hosts to advocate raiding to pay for whatever it is needs paying for this week. In all fairness, the DfID (or FCDO as they are now) don't seem to do the best job at distributing their budget, and sending aid to Pakistan and India - who both have nuclear weapons and space programmes - undermines the credibility and point of the department. 


            UK Aid as an organisation lacks many of the logistical supports needed to support emergency relief distribution, which is - for all intents and purposes - projecting power overseas. Take, for example, the Haiti disaster of 2010. The airport was severely damaged, as was the port, needing military intervention from US forces to transfer vital cargo to where it was needed. This came in the form of specialist survey/salvage teams and quite a few large amphibious vessels. 

            The undisputed masters of amphibious landings are the Armed Forces (obviously, it's not going to be the DVLA is it?). UK AID have the need to deploy medical and humanitarian aid to austere locations with almost no infrastructure and with minimal host country support (as there is a good chance local governance has completely broken down), the Armed Forces have an almost identical need in times of war. 


            This takes us on to what I think that the MOD and FCDO should collaborate on - developing and operating a class of Hospital Ships, for use supporting the Armed Forces in times of conflict and in peacetime supporting local civilian populations across the world. A joint funding programme would have to be worked out, perhaps with UK AID funding and paying to maintain the ships with the MOD paying running costs. 

BMT Ellida, configured as a Geneva compliant Hospital Ship

            The ships company proper would probably be RFA but medical teams wouldn't be. It would probably be advantageous to have a Ships Master and separate medical detachment commander, probably a Colonel or equivalent from defence. Having, say, four or five Role 3+ medical teams (with personnel from the Navy, Army, Air Force and Reserve components) would provide a continuously deployable force. The five teams would all be trained to deploy both at sea or in a field hospital. 

            Four ships would mean that a consistent cycle of maintenance, response, planned, response could be set up. Having two ships on a response deployment means that one can be based East of Suez and one West - allowing for quicker response times to incidents across the world. The remaining vessel on planned deployment could operate with a mainly civilian medical team (supported by armed forces helicopter and boat crews) from NGOs, medical students, the NHS or potentially even just general do-gooders in society. 


            Call them HMHS Maine, Bevan, Goodwill and Britannic after the name of about a million RFA hospital ships in the past, the founder of the NHS, the first Royal Navy hospital ship and probably the most famous (and sister of the Titanic). Assuming there's three medical tenders/landing craft on each, have a poll of the great British public to name all 12 - after all, that's never gone wrong before has it (HMHS Hospital McHospital Face). 

            More important than the physical infrastructure, however, is a sense of understanding between the departments - undermined by mutual respect and common sense. Everything possible should be done, both on the ground and back at Whitehall, to avoid a repeat of 3 Para's famous washing machine fiasco. 


Priority 3 - The Tilt

            The third priority the government is always waffling about is the rather controversial Indo-Pacific tilt. The tilt (not a full-scale pivot) aims to re-introduce a British presence East of Suez, a presence not seen on a significant scale since Wilson's premiership. The idea that the Indo-Pacific tilt is going to break down NATOs collective security by allowing the Russians to sneak through is, quite frankly, ridiculous. The actual hard commitment so far is two whole OPVs and a battalion of Gurkhas. 

            The cost of the Gurkha garrison in Brunei is paid for by HM The Sultan so has a negligible cost for the MOD and if Spey and Tamar were sent after the Russian Navy, the crew would probably mutiny. They are, no matter how well built, still just lightly armed patrol ships - not warfighting capabilities. The deployment costs barely nothing defence wise, £3.449 million is the average yearly cost of running a River class. But do we make more than £7 million pound from the links and relationships that Tamar and Spey are forging, I would say, probably, yes. 

            Although it can't be measured, I would hazard a guess that many friendships are being sustained by the White Ensign appearing in a harbour. 


            Imagine, just for a minute, that you're the President of a small Pacific nation, a population of, say, 1.5 million people, centred upon a little archipelago with 500,000 people living across the small islands and the rest living on the main island. You're trying to grow the nation's GDP but a large chunk of the nation's population are functionally illiterate and many people live in secluded communities, mainly accessed via canoe and/or Britten Norman Islander. 

            The police and local authorities are notoriously corrupt, with drug and human trafficking rings becoming more and more prolific. The country has been at peace since it gained independence in the late 1960's so, apart from the occasional token deployment of an infantry company and a couple of staff officers to UN missions in the area, the armed forces' (of less than 5,000 total) spend much of their time policing the country's maritime borders and trying to help stop the widespread police corruption. 

            The armed forces consist of a single brigade, with three infantry battalions, all lacking any transport except a small amount of Bushmaster PPVs (donated by Australia using slightly damaged vehicles brought back from Afghanistan) and a few antiqued lorries (barely in working order). The infantry is armed with SLRs, a few medium machine guns, sharpshooter rifles and a dozen or so 81mm mortars - reserve units are often stuck drilling with Lee Enfields. Artillery support is severely lacking - only a single battery of light guns, purchased second hand after some defence review or other here in the UK. The countries single engineer regiment (around 400 personnel in total) spends most of it's time trying to maintain the countries crumbling infrastructure. The logistics and medical force do likewise - spending more time trying to keep the country alive than training for their role. 

            The Air corps is in a similar sorry state. The singular ageing Huey helicopter hasn't flown in several decades and the small fixed wing detachment can't cope with the pressures caused by the trafficking rings as well as the masses of resupply missions needed to support the small communities. 

            Naval forces are just as bad, the entire fleet consists of a minesweeper that's literally falling apart, a single (quite small) OPV and a pair of newish Patrol Boats - again donated by Australia. The fleet (if we can call it that) is scarred by numerous incidents involving collisions with small boats and officers and ratings are poorly trained.

It all looks a bit bleak, doesn't it


            But now the Chinese turn up and ask you, the President, if you need some assistance on your island. In exchange for allowing their ships to dock, the Chinese government will fund a new port, airport and military infrastructure to go with the shiny new ships, planes and APCs they'll give you. You sign the deal immediately, after all why wouldn't you. 

            These Chinese fellas aren't all bad anyway are they? Sure, those Westerners are always decrying them as evil but why should we trust them - after all it was only 60 years ago when *REDACTED* troops were roaming our streets enforcing their brutal colonial regime. Most of their leaders were alive back then, many might have even been soldiers - occupying our land, stealing our resources and ultimately sealing our fate as just poor, backwards tribals. 

            That nice Chinese man didn't tell you about the loan though, did he? You thought the port was a gift from them to their newest ally. Of course it wasn't, you now owe your soul and all your money for the next century to our almighty overlord Winnie the Pooh, and there's nothing you can do. 


            But what can stop this, at our end (you're not the President of a small Pacific nation anymore, just some random English bloke -unless you're one of my 4 Bahraini readers, in which case you're just a random Bahraini now). Well, of course it's some good old Joined Up Thinking™ (Joined Up Thinking is a registered trademark of Think Defence Ltd, all rights reserved, yada yada). 


            Imagine, just for a minute, you're now a mandarin (I know, you get around a bit) sitting in your lovely home office, wearing the top half of your pinstriped suit (Pinstriped Y-fronts on show to anyone who walks into your spare bedroom), reruns of Yes Minister playing in the background. 

            What department you're mandarining for is irrelevant; it could be the MOD, FCDO, whatever the Board of Trade go by nowadays, like I said, irrelevant.  Now, your mate from the Foreign Office rings you up, and tells you about his shitty overseas job - he has to put his pinstriped trousers on and leave his spare bedroom, for Gods sake! 

Crikey, not my pinstriped trousers!

            Now, you do some snooping, as does your friend, and finds out what the President already knows about the state of this small Pacific country. (I'm not summarising, you all know the score). 

            So, with the power of speedy Joined Up Thinking™, a working group is convened on the country and a plan of action is created. It begins with gaining the trust of the nation's politicians and people (politicians are quite easy - booze at the embassy and/or state visit to London, the general public might be harder, but remember the Hospital Ship from earlier - that should do the trick). 

            Then Sandhurst gets busy, as does Dartmouth, Cranwell and even the Met Police college at Hendon, training the officers of said countries military, police and even civil service, why not. The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund can then provide the newly-trained military with with equipment - most of the funding ending up back in the Treasury's coffers if we provide them with British made rifle, handcuffs and pinstriped suits. 

            While all these land navigation, arresting and Mandarining lessons (watching Yes Minister - The Complete Boxset several times) are ongoing, the nice people at UK Aid and the British Forces travel to our Pacific island. There, they can train the locals and generally integrate into the local community. Basic infantry courses can be set up in most places, as can low level development of infrastructure (courtesy of the CRE) and local medical facilities can be developed - both people and equipment - with local doctors at the forefront of the programme - and with integration to avoid the washing machine fiasco, at the risk of sounding like a broken record. 


            So, there, you have it, with minimal actual spending we have simultaneously made an ally, helped out people in need and stopped Chinese expansion. All in a days work from your local expert at everything (that's me!)

BMR 

God Save The King

PS. Read this by Sir Humphrey, from the Thin Pinstriped Line blog

07 January 2023

Owning The Littorals - What's a Future Commando?

Owning the Littorals

What's a Future Commando?


Owning the Littorals is a series by BMR on the merits and capabilities of amphibious forces and what I believe their future should be. View the full series here and part one here.
 
           Over the past 20 years or so, the Royal Marines have found themselves utilised more and more as a plain old light role infantry brigade, taking their turn to deploy on OP Telic and OP Herrick just as much (if not more) than the Army's Brigades. However, with the return to contingency after the conclusion of combat operations in Afghanistan, it was decided that the illusion of a brigade-level amphibious assault should be dropped in favour of a focus on smaller unit tactics and raiding.


Landlocked Marines

            This began with experimentation using a company of 43 Commando exercising and wargaming in the UK, US, Gibraltar and Cyprus. The purpose of these was not to thrash the Yanks (which didn't happen) as the tabloids reported, but to try and experiment with how these small unit tactics could affect the battle at higher echelons - it was more fact finding than preparing for any imminent operation.

            The Vanguard Strike Company, as it was known, was given lots of leeway to trial and test out all sorts of tactics, small unit structures and equipment, begged borrowed and quite probably stolen from anywhere they could get their hands on. Some of the changes so far are slightly superficial; the adoption of a new uniform, for example, and the White Ensign being worn in the place of the Union Flag - although all these changes seem to be trying to bolster the additional emphasis on the Marines' naval role.


C8 and a Green Ensign

            Some changes have not been so superficial though, Vanguard Company have been experimenting with Unmanned Vehicles and loitering munitions (with the Switchblade 300 and 600 reportedly now being in service with the wider Corps) as well as new vehicles, like the allyest of ally wagons - the Polaris MRZR now spreading across the armed forces like an STI.


Can't carry much, but ally as fuck


            Most of these changes are intended to reflect upon the Corps' primary role as naval infantry, coming from the sea and melting back into it as soon as they arrived, and illustrating the point that their role is not to deliver massive forces across the shore but to land small groups of elite forces in dispersed spots across a coastline.

            These forces could accomplish a wide range of operations, from gathering intelligence, targeting enemy headquarters' with small raids to seizing and holding port facilities to allow heavier forces to disembark.

            To accomplish this, the traditional 30 man troop is being replaced by a much smaller 12 man Commando Strike Team, lacking an officer, instead being commanded by a Sergeant. Now - ignoring the obvious parallels with the US Marines micro-platoon, beefy little squad - 12 is a very nice number to work with.

            As any of you who learnt your times tables in primary school know, two sixes, three fours, four threes and six twos all equal twelve, taking a two man command element (commander and signaller) two five man teams could be organised.

            Now look at the Commando Forces' vehicles; the Wildcat carries six passengers, the Offshore Raiding Craft - eight, the Land Rover Wolf (if it's still going) six. Six Marines is half a troop, meaning two Wildcat's can deliver a troop - or three could deliver a troop and a couple of add-ons with a gunner in each. 

            It's a similar story with the ORC, a new programme to upgrade the thirty-nine strong fleet is underway - the upgraded model is going to be painted grey instead of the existing green (suggesting a bigger focus further out to sea) and known as the Commando Raiding Craft.


ORC10, the CRC prototype

            Upgrades seem to include standardising on a forward console (instead of having forward, centre and rear consoles) for the crew, increase the crew habitability and temperature control as much as possible in an open vehicle, upgrade the armour and weapons fit, install a Raymarine Quantum CHIRP navigation radar and a new removable transom for carrying the Commando Inflatable Craft (which has replaced the Zodiac).

            It is intended that two CRC's are to support a single Commando Strike Team, with fire and mobility support. For that purpose, all CRC's have mounts to fit either a GPMG or HMG on the port and starboard sides to the aft and a single GPMG mount (intended to be left empty in high sea states and long transits - the planning range is up to 150 nautical miles).

            The Royal Marines have acknowledged that this arrangement is sub-optimal - and that one Strike Team should travel in one boat. The Globe And Laurel article which discloses most of this information makes repeated reference to a new boat which 'is already being designed' to replace both the ORC/CRC and the Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel - due to be in service around the 2025 mark.


For illustrative purposes only, CB90 can't carry MRZRs


            This aligns nicely with a request for information put out by the Defence and Security Accelerator for a 'novel amphibious craft' able to
  • travel at sustained high speeds (at least 25kts) over a long range (up to 350 nautical miles) in Sea State 2
  • provide the ability to deliver personnel and light vehicles to a coastal access point with limited or no impact on operational speed/capability
  • relaunch and return from the coastal access point
  • operate with a low signature across all spectrums (thermal, radar, visual, acoustic, etc)  to reduce the probability of detection
            It needs to be able to do this with four crew (2 drivers, 1 coxwain, and a load master) while being configurable:
  • to carry and deliver up to 24 embarked persons and 4 crew fit to fight (considerations should be given to the environmental impacts on personnel and equipment)
  • to carry and secure 2x Light Vehicles and six embarked persons and boat crew (consider for calculations a Polaris MRZR(D). Each vehicle being approximately 3.56m long, 1.86m high, 1.51m wide, Curb weight 953 kg, Payload capacity 680kg.)
  • to carry and secure 2x Inflatable Craft and 2x Outboard Motors (OBMs) plus 14 embarked persons and 4 boat crew. (Consider for calculations an inflatable length 5.0m, width 2.08m, height 0.9m, weight 145 kg, Consider a 50hp OBM of 75kg).
            This all adds up to being an MOD attempt to see what information they can gain about the potential CRC/LCVP replacement. It seems logical that the Royal Marines would want to replace the ageing LCVP with something that could transport troops at much higher speed, and in much greater comfort than was previously achievable.

            The primary downside I can see to this approach is the loss of the LCVP's other role - namely V for vehicle. However, after the Snatch situation in the early 2000's, most vehicles have been getting bigger and bigger so the ability to transport even the lightest of the bunch is getting less and less useful - above the likes of the MRZR and Skidoo sit Jackal, which I've never seen in an LCVP.

            Assuming, however, the compartment for the two MRZRs is 7.5m long, 1.8m wide and 1.85m tall (which seems like a probable size needed to quickly manoeuvre out of) then seven NATO standard pallets could be accommodated inside the boat.

            We can also see the new 12 man centric theory at work again - each boat could carry two Strike Teams, Half a Strike Team on MRZRs or a Strike Team and two more Marines to operate the Commando Inflatable Craft.

            Another innovation of the Future Commando Force is the use of drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Uncrewed Air Systems or whatever we're calling them this week. (I'm going with Unmanned Systems, or the RAF's RPAS initialism - and I'm dying on this hill).

            Although not only a Commando Force innovation, small RPAS are featuring heavily in basically everything the Royals are doing, in use for practically anything - from improving situational awareness at the section level to blowing stuff up.

            The RPAS are complemented by the Android Team Awareness Kit (or iPad, to you and me) allowing commanders at the lowest level to improve situational awareness, whether by linking to data feeds and live imagery from his own organic man-portable RPAS or receiving images from higher level reconnaissance assets.

            These include several different types ranging from the Anduril Ghost, a man portable design, all the way up to the G3 Systems designed Heavy Lift UAV. The Ghost has a maximum flight time of 55 minutes, can be readied for operation by a single operator in three minutes, is capable of operationg near-autonomously in swarms and is practically silent.

            The Heavy Lift UAV was procured under the PODS umbrella, meaning that everything needed to operate the system, and the system itself, is contained in a 20 foot ISO container - improving deployability greatly. (As an aside, sticking one on the River class OPV in the Caribbean would probably help in hurricane season.) 


Drone in a box

            Having the ability to carry relatively large payloads will significantly aid the Commando Forces' ability to transport heavy equipment without having to drag it around - and the ability to transport a casualty is interesting, to say the least.

            It is also known that Switchblade loitering munitions are in service with the corps, but not to what extent.
            
             Switchblade 300 is a small (about two foot) loitering munition which can be transported and operated by a single soldier - the whole system weighs less than 3 kg. It has a maximum range of 10kg and a ten minute loiter time. Handily, it is controlled by a ground control system identical to that of the Puma UAV (also in RM service), and both platforms can theoretically be controlled by the same station simultaneously. The explosive is roughly equivalent to a 40mm grenade, and has been air launched from a USMC Osprey - perhaps this could be a useful addition to the Wildcat (in army service as well).


Just like the mortar, innit?

            It's big brother, the Switchblade 600, weighs significantly more - the full system being over 50kg - but can be assembled in less than ten minutes, and breaks down to technically man portable levels (although the man porting it would probably disagree). It has a maximum range of 80 km (although relay stations need to be utilised to achieve this) and a 20 minute loiter time at 40 km - the punch is a similar warhead to that found on a Javelin ATGM, giving indirect anti-tank capabilities to the Marines.

            More unmanned systems are either in service or soon to be in service but, like much of the FCF programme, not much is known and press releases are very limited.

            In the next part of this article, we're going to discuss what I think the Commando force can and should provide at readiness for amphibious raiding, assaults, exercises and disaster relief.



06 January 2023

Owning the Littorals - An Introduction

 Owning the Littorals

An introduction

This is part one of a series based around the capability and future of the Future Commando Force. For the full series, click here, for part two, click here



            Several months ago, I wrote a piece about my thoughts on future amphibious forces. In this article, I make a number of assumptions about the future of the amphibious force, most of which meant an increase in spending would be needed. Since I wrote that article, it has become clear that an uplift in defence spending to any significant level is more and more unlikely, and if it is to come than amphibious forces should probably not be the first priority to see that money. In this series of articles, I'm going to discuss some of the ideas and concepts around the Future Commando Force but first, why are amphibious forces needed?

            The first reason I believe that amphibious forces are important is to preserve a fully sovereign capability for the British Government to project power overseas. While Carrier Strike is obviously an important part of overseas power projection, airstrikes alone (or even in tandem with naval strikes) cannot win a war alone. A modern example of this would be the First Libyan Civil War in 2011, where NATO (and international) forces enforced a no-fly zone and performed airstrikes on Colonel Gaddafi's government forces - but no NATO ground forces were deployed (except a few special forces and personnel recovery teams). The lack of forces to engage government forces in support of the rebels is potentially one of the many factors that the Libyan Crisis is still ongoing, although a ceasefire is in place. If amphibious forces had been deployed and fully utilised then there is potential that the situation in Libya may well have turned out very different.
 
           On the contrary, it could be argued that amphibious forces should not be prioritised in budget and manpower distribution because the Armed Forces need to focus their main effort on other capabilities; namely armoured forces to fight Russians on the Eastern Flank. The need to protect Eastern NATO members has obviously returned to the forefront after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and so it could be argued that more money should be going towards IFVs or more MBTs instead of the ability to take beaches. Obviously NATO commitments are very important so might take precedence over any other commitments and capabilities, including the amphibious force.
 
           However, I believe that Russia is an ever diminishing threat. This can be seen in Ukraine (a second rate power at best) where 'elite' Russian troops seem to regularly be beaten by Ukrainian forces, many of whom have little training and no allies (on the ground) - although some modern western equipment is being used to great effect. Now imagine that modern western equipment is used by troops who've trained and operated them for years - knowing every trick and little nuance of their systems - Russian forces would be decimated (at least) by our continental NATO allies; the Polish, French and maybe even the Germans. President Putin knows this, the only way Russia remains a threat is through their possession and probably will to use nuclear weapons. The best way British forces can contribute to deterring Russia is the same way we have been deterring Russia for the past 53 years - the continuous at sea deterrent.
 
           Britain's biggest conventional threats are probably more likely to be Iran, Chinese expansion in Africa, and North Korea - Kim's never ending attempts at being the most evil man on the planet have been beaten by Putin's special military operation - although his missile tests and 'drone strikes' (or remote control aeroplane, take your pick) seem to be trying to claim back his title. China are expanding their soft power and power projection capabilities in South America and Africa, notably for British Forces, they seem to have a new friend in Argentina. Therefore it would make sense if we prioritised the ability to deploy around the world - and especially in Africa and South America - in support of our allies to train, mentor and defeat insurgencies. (This is a topic worthy of a several volume academic book, and one which desperately needs joined up thinking™  between government departments.)
 
           The final reason I believe that amphibious forces need investment is because of their utility in other tasks. An amphibious warship has masses of space in a vehicle deck, intended for vehicles (obviously!) but that can reconfigured for basically anything, from disaster relief to special forces infiltration, to basic logistics and as a flagship for a task force. This inherent flexibility means that amphibious forces are some of the most hardworking ships of the naval force; the Bay class quite often have two out of three deployed in the Gulf and Caribbean for long stretches of time. To get rid of these would be a major set back in the UK's soft power as well as any offensive capability loss.
 
           Those are the reasons I believe that amphibious forces are an important part of a modern balanced fleet, in part two of this series I'll discuss some of the concepts and theories of the new Future Commando Force.

Read Part Two here.