24 October 2022

Does Britain Need Corvettes?

Does Britain Need Corvettes?

            Often derided as being for ships for small navies, the Royal Navy has not had a Corvette in commission since the 1950's and the demise of the wartime Castle Class. In this article, I'm going to argue for a new class of Corvettes in Royal Navy service, intended to increase hull numbers and provide a much needed boost to dwindling escort numbers.



Britannia's Corvettes

            Although short, the Royal Navy's history with corvettes (in the modern sense of the term) is an excellent tale of ingenuity and Great British engineering. With the exception of HMS Calliope - technically a corvette but in reality just a drill ship on the Tyne - which left service in 1951, the Royal Navy has operated two classes of corvettes in the semi-modern era. Both were born from the destitute of war and if any ships truly could claim such a large hand in winning the war, then the Flower and her cousin, the Castle class corvettes have the best shot.


Flower class

            The Flower class was based of a civilian design, the 700 ton whaler Southern Pride, by Smiths Dock Company on Teeside. The class were originally envisioned as convoy escorts within coastal areas (a Littoral Combat Ship, if you will) but with the U-Boat menace being virtually undetectable in the open Atlantic (a Phantom Menace, if you will- I'm on a roll today!) then the class were pressed into service operating in the Mid-Atlantic, where convoys could not be supported by land-based forces, operating in a ASW role. Due to their simple design, they could both be operated primarily by Reservists and conscripts (many who had experience on similar civilian vessels) and be manufactured in smaller yards which had primarily built civilian ships pre-war, leading to widespread adoption with many Navies.

            During the war, 294 were built, to be operated by the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, US Navy, Free French Navy, Free Belgian Navy, Royal Hellenic Navy (that's the Greeks to you and me), Royal Indian Navy, Royal Netherlands Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy, Royal Norwegian Navy, South African Navy, Royal Yugoslav Navy and (curiously) the Kriegsmarine, who'd managed to capture four half-built ships when the French surrendered without rendering them useless beforehand. Once the war was over, some of the now surplus ships were sold to Argentina, Chile, Denmark, Dominica, Egypt, Israel, Ireland, Venezuela, China, Thailand and Yugoslavia. The success of the design was primarily it's easy to operate systems, low cost, ease of manufacture and simple crewing.

            The Flower-class had a relatively light armament of one 4-inch gun, 2 Vickers 50 calibre Machine Guns and 2 twin-mounted Lewis guns. This was because of it's main role as an Anti Submarine Ship which precluded the fitting of 2 Depth Charge Throwers and 2 Depth Charge Rails. They were crewed by 85 officers and ratings with a range of 3,500 nautical miles and a top speed of 16 knots, which was slow for a warship at the time but perfectly adequate for shepherding slow moving merchant convoys. 


Castle Class

            The Castle class were designed in early 1943 due to the need for more capable ocean-going convoy escorts to replace the existing Flower class in the Mid-Atlantic, where they could technically operate but with heavy crew fatigue, so were designed from the outset to be easily built and crewed by engineers and crews familiar with the Flower class. Indeed, the Castle class could probably be described as a 'Flower Batch 2' due to their design similarities. The Castle class had an extended fo'c'sle and the mast behind the open bridge and was 37 foot longer and 400 tons heavier than the Flowers, which helped prevent the excessive pitch and roll the earlier class were notorious for.

A Castle Class Corvette

            Due to a much-improved hull form, the ships could get an extra half-knot to the Flowers despite using the same engines. So that the ships could be constructed simply and efficiently by civilian yards, the wireless and radar offices were built as prefabricated structures and then inserted into the hull. This allowed the complex parts of the vessels to be built in specialist factories which were then combined with the rather simple hulls, built in commercial yards up and down the county.

            The class had a heavier armament than their their predecessors of one four inch combined air/surface gun, 2 twin 20 mm anti-aircraft guns and 6 20 mm Oerlikon cannons to complement it's main armament of a depth charge rail capable of discharging 15 depth charges and a single squid anti-submarine mortar. The extra weapons meant that the class had a larger complement of 115 officers and ratings. 95 of the class were planned but the end of the war meant only 44 actually entered service with three destroyed in action- HM Ships Denbigh Castle, Hurst castle and His Norwegian Majesty's Ship Tunsberg Castle.



Modern Day Corvettes

            In this section of the article we're going to look at some modern examples of corvettes in service around the world with allied, non-aligned and competing navies. We'll look at the sizes, tactics and different operational uses of corvettes, both in the present and near future. 


What is a Corvette?

            Since different navies call different sized ships different things for various doctrinal and political things it can be hard to form an actual definition for what a 'corvette' is. For example, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (not a navy, promise!) operate a 'helicopter destroyer' which just so happens to have it's deck perfectly sized to operate F-35s and what the hell's a through-deck cruiser? These are some of the more politically charged questionable names but there is times when naming conventions are changed for doctrinal reasons. In this section I'm going to push the boundaries of what is a 'corvette' a little bit so we can get a fuller picture of different operations around the world.


Littoral Combat Ship

            The US Navy doesn't operate any corvettes, the role instead being filled by the Littoral Combat Ships. These are two classes of small ships that operate in littoral regions and are 'small, fast, manoeuvrable and relatively inexpensive'. The LCS is not actually a single class of ships but two completely different developments- the Freedom class (even pennant numbers) which have a conventional monohull design and the Independence class (odd pennant numbers) which feature a trimaran hull design.

            While on the larger side of what could be called a 'corvette' the LCS would definitely not be considered a frigate due to it's rather light armament and lack of survivability (this isn't a design flaw, it was intended- the US Navy aren't sending them to fight anyone better equipped than Somali pirates) but there is probably room to class them as there own type, separate to anything used before.

            The base hull is armed with a 57mm Naval gun (the same gun to be used on the Type 31 frigate), a SeaRAM system and 4 .50 calibre HMGs. This is intended to provide a basic armament and isn't removed from the ship, although other weapons (including Hellfire missiles and 30mm cannons) can be added as part of the 'mission modules'which can be (technically, at least) swapped allowing ships to be reroled in a matter of days. These mission modules come with their own crew to operate the (mainly offboard) systems. Packages include: 
Surface Warfare- two 30mm guns, counter-boat missiles, two 11 metre RHIBs, MH-60 helicopter and Fire Scout UAVs. The systems are designed to engage small boats and 'suicide attacks'. I think we should be looking carefully potentially use similar weapons in the Gulf.
Anti-Submarine Warfare- The ASW module has a Sonar 2087 towed array (used on the Type 26) and a helicopter deploying torpedoes. 
Mine Countermeasures- The MCM package features a variety of offboard minesweeping systems, I won't go into much detail as the Royal Navy seems to have this nailed this with ARCIMS.

            Overall, the Littoral Combat Ship is an interesting theory with solid concepts behind it but the execution of the programme was full of delays and riddled with problems. It is quite telling, I think, that the US Navy have decided to do away with the modularity in the ships payload, but the good thing about modularity is that as better systems are developed they can be integrated much easier than with 'built-in' systems.


Skjold-class Corvette

            The Skjold class (Shield in Norwegian) are six very fast corvettes in service with the Royal Norwegian Navy. They were initially classed as Motor Torpedo Boats until 2009 when they were changed to be classified as Corvettes partially because of their excellent seaworthiness and partially because some bright spark Naval Officer worked out that they had never actually carried torpedoes.

            The role of the class is to essentially deliver a crucifying blow to any enemy operating near the Norwegian coasts (mentioning no names, Vlad). To achieve this aim, the Skjold class are very heavily armed for their size, with eight Naval Strike Missiles held in launchers to the aft of the craft, a 76mm naval gun in a stealth mount, 2 HMGs and a Sea Protector RWS.

            As well as her heavy armament, they manage to utilise their small stature and incredibly high speed (more than 25 knots in Sea State 5) to evade and close on the enemy, very successfully. Their high speeds are achieved by utilising a rather unique system of a 'skirt' between a catamaran-style hull, in which a large fan blows air - increasing buoyancy and manoeuvrability at high speeds. 

A Skjold Class Corvette

            The Skjold class also has a 'mission bay' which is primarily used for 8 Harpoon missiles but can also be used to carry 153 passengers in a civilian evacuation role, or 102 troops, who the Corvette can provide with naval gunfire support from the 76mm gun, held in a stealth mount. The Royal Marines worked with the Royal Norwegian Navy, testing the vessel and operating concepts, as part of the Future Commando Force and were reportedly very impressed with the operating concepts - which focused a lot on small scale raiding on small islands, a focus of the FCF.


Vanguard Class Multirole Warship

            Although not an active warship, and calling it a corvette is questionable, but Kongsberg have created an interesting proposal, primarily for the Royal Norwegian Navy, but also for export. The Vanguard Multirole Warship is based around a mentality of 'offboard first' and features a large 'multi purpose hanger' which is rather similar to the Type 26 Frigate's mission bay.

            The proposal features different configurations of roles, all carried aboard a 'mothership' built mainly to civilian standards (although with allowances made for weapons and ammunition handling) which could be mainly manufactured in smaller yards - potentially not even defence specialists.

            While not an actual ship (or even design), it is still interesting to consider nontheless, and speaking of ships that aren't corvettes....



Bigger Bloody Guns

            One of the Royal Navy's most often overlooked assets is the River Class Offshore Patrol Vessels, a rare win for British Shipbuilding. Calling them a 'class' is actually quite misleading; the fourteen ships are divided into at least five sub-classes; the Batch One River (Tyne, Severn, and Mersey), Al-Zubara or the Royal Bahrain Naval Force (formerly HMS Clyde, or 'Batch 1.5') Amazonas Class (of the Brazilian Navy), Batch Two River Class ( HM Ships Forth, Medway, Trent, Tamar, and Spey) and Krabi class (of the Royal Thai Navy). Out of the four operators of one of the subvariants, three (UK, Bahrain and Thailand) call them Patrol ships while Brazil defines them as Corvettes.


A Brief History

            The River class have an interesting history, a tale of Bahrain and Brexit, Suez and Scotland; being one of the best (but understated) export success' for the British Shipbuilding industry in the past few decades. 

            It started with the procurement of three Batch One Vessels to replace the five Island Class patrol boats (which were brought into service due to the Cod War), they were a lot bigger than their forebearers, with a much better endurance and availability (hence fewer hulls). They were intended solely to perform fishery protection, anti-piracy and counter terrorism duties around the UK EEZ, hence their incredibly light armament of a single 20mm cannon and a pair of GPMGs. This was perfectly adequate for a ship whose main opponent was probably going to be some Icelandic fishermen, where the accommodation for 18 more personnel (whether Marines or Fisheries officials) would be a lot more useful.

            However, the Icelandic fishermen decided to stop trying their chances with the Royal Navy, but HM Government did not; shrinking the fleet even more. This meant that there wasn't as many frigates and destroyers to conduct routine patrol and 'showing the flag' operations. It was then decided to test the Rivers ability to operate outside of the mainland British Waters. It was found that the main thing hindering such operations was the lack of aviation facilities - primarily a flight deck.

            The MOD took these findings and turned them into HMS Clyde, a modification of the River class (hence Batch 1.5). She was extended by some two metres, allowing a Merlin capable flight deck to be added. Due to her intended role on Atlantic Patrol Tasking (South) (formerly known as the Falkland Islands Guardship) to replace HM Ships Dumbartan Castle and Leeds Castle, Clyde was equipped with a heavier armament of a 30 mm main gun, two miniguns and five GPMGs.  

            HMS Clyde sailed for the South Atlantic very soon after commissioning, staying in the region without returning to the UK mainland for twelve years, patrolling and deterring aggression for the entire time; her only time off station was a well needed period of maintenance in South Africa. She was relieved from APT(S) in late 2019 by HMS Forth and returned to the Portsmouth, where she was further sold on to the Royal Bahrain Naval Force who she serves as RBNS Al-Zubara.

            BAE Systems soon realised that they were on to a winning design as so started work on an upgraded River Class Patrol ship - designed entirely for export. This eventually turned into the Port of Spain class OPV, built for the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard. However, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago cancelled the order, after completion of the ships and while their crews were training. The Brazilian Government took the opportunity and bought the pre-completed ships of BAE Systems for the price of £133 million.
 
            Unlike the Rivers, the Brazilian Navy classifies the Amazonas' as Corvettes (although sources really are quite murky - I've seen both the OPV and Corvette description used) which makes the seem a lot heavier armed than they are, having an armament of a 30mm cannon as the main gun, two GPMGs and the main difference from the Rivers, two 20mm guns on the bridge wings. 

            The Brazilian Navy uses the Amazonas in a similar role to the Rivers, patrolling EEZ and territorial waters, counter-piracy and the like. The 25mm guns would probably come in useful in a contact with smaller boats however it is to be noted that they are not to be used in a peer or near peer engagement.

The River Family

            To preserve the UK's shipbuilding skill and knowledge in the gap between the Type 45 Destroyers and QE class Carriers, the MOD signed a Terms of Business Agreement with BAE which meant that the UK Government had to provide work. This was to stop 'skill fade' and to preserve the specialist knowledge and employees to build future vessels; meaning the MOD had to order ships in the gaps. However, there was a major problem in the fact that most of the 'white collar' naval architects were employed in the design stage of what would later become the Type 26 Frigate.

            This left the MOD in the unfortunate predicament of having to procure an off the shelf design from BAE's (somewhat limited) catalogue and it was deemed that the Amazonas class Corvette was the best of the options. After a small amount of work to make the design more UK specific (mainly to the flight deck and aviation facilities but also adding extra survivability and the Shared Infrastructure Operating System), work began on the five Batch 2 River Class Ships on the Clyde.

            The first of these ships, HMS Forth, was completed in late 2016 and, after successful sea trials, she was commissioned into the Royal Navy on the 13 April 2018. Later, Forth was followed by her sisters, HM Ships Medway, Trent and Tamar, with the youngest of the five, Spey, commissioning on the 18 June 2021.


The Rivers Now

            Originally, it was planned that the five Batch Two would replace the four Batch One (and a half) OPVs, with the crews essentially just transferring straight across. However, Brexit happened (I don't know if anyone heard) and that was seen as justification to keep the three Batch One's (although as I mentioned before, Clyde was disposed of). The eight remaining ships are used for two fundamentally different roles, with a Batch 1/2 split.

            The three Batch One Rivers are maintained in UK Home Waters conducting mainly maritime security roles, all around the British Isles. They were notionally meant to be 'forward deployed' to their namesake river although I don't think that actually happens in practise (does sometimes docking in Newcastle really count as forward deployment anyway?) and are crewed in a similar vein to the Hydrographic Squadron, with a three watch system where, at any one time, two watches are aboard with the third on leave or attending courses. 

            The rest of the Rivers are forward deployed around the globe (not just to Liverpool) with HMS Forth being deployed on Atlantic Patrol Tasking (South) (formerly the Falkland Islands Guardship), HMS Medway serves on APT(N) (formerly West Indies Guardship), HMS Trent is based in Gibraltar - from where she provides a presence in the Mediterranean and HM Ships Tamar and Spey are based in the Indo-Pacific. It was expected that APT(S) would be fulfilled by an OPV; anything larger would be a waste of resources considering the threat posed by Argentina is minimal nowadays. Medway's deployment was slightly less expected but following in the footsteps of the Batch One's (She is joined by an RFA during Hurricane season to make up for her shortfalls).

            Less than expected, however, was the deployment of Tamar and Spey to the Indo-Pacific region. No British Warships have been permanently deployed to the region since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, and the disbandment of the Hong Kong Squadron; this was potentially an even bigger statement of British interests in the region than the CSG21 deployment - while the Queen Elizabeth was on station for a few months, Tamar and Spey will be in the region for possibly a decade or more.

            The pair of OPVs have an important but often overlooked role of defence diplomacy; conducting training with navies and coast guards across the region, providing disaster relief and providing a presence and a White Ensign to small island nations. This role is especially important as one of the greatest risks to UK national interests is China's expansion across the world (particularly in the Indo-Pacific) and China is using it's economic might to try and make allies and partners - a Royal Navy warship, probably larger than their fleet flagship, docking in their capital city for a drinks reception on the flight deck hosted by His Majesty's Ambassador, where an audience would be rather more receptive to British foreign policy might convince a foreign country where their bread is buttered, so to speak. This could well be a role for the National Flagship (assuming that wasn't sunk with Boris) but the River Batch 2 conduct it well, as Sir Humphrey argues in this excellent post. 

            It is a massive credit to the excellent logistical support of the UK Armed Forces that the Royal Navy can keep two warships sustained, on the other side of the planet, and with no home port in particular to return to for refuelling and restocking. 


Why no VLS?

            Although very obviously not meant to be a major (or even minor) combatant, the River class are often derided online for being 'underarmed' for 'their role' with the 30mm gun being touted as insufficient to deal with any threats they are posed with. This completely ignores the fact that the River are constabulary vessels and are not intended to partake in actual warfare, the 30mm is entirely to provide a self defence capability while the crew sail away as fast as possible.

        However, it could be argued that the Rivers lack any meaningful armament to defend themselves properly. Navy Lookout posted an interesting article proposing upgrade to the Class to a reasonable degree (not including Mk. 41 or angled flight deck, unfortunately) which had three major levels of upgrade which could be achieved; the OPV Plus (40mm main gun, two 30mm on the bridge wings and an armed UAV housed in a container), the OPV Max (57mm main gun, two 30mm and a folding hanger to accommodate a Wildcat) and the largest, the 'River class Corvette,' which goes all out, with a 57mm  gun, two 30mms, 8 Surface to Surface guided weapons and an armed Unmanned Surface Vessel, in place of one of the RHIBs. The article can be viewed in full here.



My Proposal

            In conclusion, I believe that the River Class are perfectly suited and armed for their role as constabulary vessels. Beside the addition of containerised UAV facilities, there really is not much that needs adding for this role.

It's obviously not that simple though, otherwise the article would end here. 

            The Rivers are capable constabulary vessels, however are capable constabulary vessels needed in a Royal Navy fit for the future? I would argue that the 'Patrol Ship' as it is now is quite probably an outdated concept for a multitude of reasons.

            Firstly, the proliferation of so-called 'grey zone' threats (yes, I was about to be sick typing that) around the world is growing. Countries around the world have found it is much more politically feasible, cost effective and simpler to, instead of all-out peer-peer warfare, just pay some small tinpot dictator or terrorist group to instead perform the actual act in exchange for propping up their nation or supplying arms. The risk from these acts range all the way from USS Cole type suicide attacks (potentially utilising 'swarm attacks' all the way up to potential 'dirty bombs' loaded onto a large ship sailing towards Folkstone.

            In a situation like this, it is incredibly likely that the first ship able to respond would be (you guessed it) a River class. With the exception of the Fleet Ready Escort (FRE) which is either a frigate or destroyer held at high readiness to deploy to any situation around the world. Working in home waters is absolutely not the main role of the FRE however, and they could quite possibly be already deployed anywhere across the world as they quite often are.

            Another reason that the humble OPV could well be outdated is that the Royal Navy has shrunk significantly since HMS Tyne was commissioned in 2003; the Royal navy currently operates six destroyers and twelve frigates, back then twenty frigates and eleven destroyers formed the core of the surface fleet. It is incredibly likely now then, that where a major surface combatant would be utilised for a task, it is now probable that a River class might be sent to perform the role of a frigate - and hope nobody shoots back.

            Bearing all this in mind, I am now proposing that the Royal Navy probably should purchase a class of 'Corvettes', to be forward deployed around the world and at home, both to conduct maritime security taskings which do not need a full fat Type 26 but also to be able to handle itself in a shooty war.

            In a shrinking economy (and therefore defence budget) and a recruiting crisis, nothing comes for free - everything needs a role to replace. I would therefore propose that this new corvette would replace a range of ships currently used by the Royal Navy.

            The first ship classes my proposed corvette would replace is the Hunt and Sandown Class Mine Countermeasures Vessels (MCMV). Due to the advancement of unmanned systems, both of these classes are due to be replaced by offboard systems. Part of their replacement, however, is three 'motherships' to extend the range, maintain and provide protection to the USV.

            The second would be the River class Batch One and Two. While they are excellent ships, the Batch One, especially, are getting older and slightly worn due to the high demand of their role; often spending up to 300 days in the North Sea. The replacement for the class is due to start design at some point in the 2030s, to be commissioned around 2036.

            The final (and probably most controversial) class of ships that I would replace is the Type 31 General Purpose Frigate. Unfortunately, the Type 31 has already begun construction, making it much harder to cancel the project. However, the Type 31 would make a very capable small warship/large patrol ship for a smaller navy, meaning that an export deal could probably be arranged (I believe New Zealand will need a replacement for their two frigates quite soon, and production could stop after that).



A New Castle Class

            In this final section of the article, I am going to outline my plan for a new Corvette class. Since the Royal Navy has only operated two; the Castle and Flower class, I decided to go with the Castle class as a name - I don't think a new HMS Sunflower would go down well with the press. The namesake class had 44 examples built, however I doubt that the budget could stretch that far - even if Wallace gets his 3% - I think that 15 is an optimum number, although we'd be lucky to get 12.


Bullshit Naval Architecture

            Now, I'm not a naval architect but just like everybody else on the internet, I can pretend to be so I'm going to outline my perfect corvette (or light frigate, if that's what Main Building prefers). The ship would have a displacement of around 3,000 tons (give or take) and be around 110 metres long, with a beam of around 16 metres.

             At the bow, there would be the same Mark 45 gun that will serve as the primary armament on the Type 26 ASW frigate; the Mk45 is a capable gun in service with many of the Royal Navy's primary partners including the US, Danish, Royal Australian and New Zealand Navies. The ship would also have a secondary armament of 2 40mm Mark guns (placed in the same positions as on the Type 31 on the hanger roof and just aft of the main gun). These would operate as a vital part of the ships defences against small boats and drones.

            The ship would be armed with a 16 cell Sea Ceptor VLS Surface to Air missile system. Sea Ceptor (part of the CAMM family) is a missile fired from a vertical launch system using a cold-launch system, meaning the missile is well away from the ship when the motor ignites. To round of the ships armament would be a defensive fit of two 30mm guns on the bridge wings and the usual range of GPMGs and miniguns (probably four of each).

            As well as the ships onboard weapons, offboard systems would be utilised heavily, with a range of deployment methods. At the aft end of the ship, Unmanned Arial Vehicles could be operated from the Merlin sized flight deck. These could be stored in a spacious 'kennel' underneath the aft 40mm guns magazine space. On both sides of this would be two hangers, sized to accommodate helicopters of around AW149 size. The ability to carry two means that the ship can perform boarding and surveillance operations exceptionally well, as well as provide a space where larger UAVs could be stored, in addition to the provided kennel.

            Underneath the hanger and flight deck would be a 'mission bay' which could be utilised in a variety of roles, from disaster relief and secure prisoner containment to minehunting. A ramp at the aft of the ship would provide rapid deployment of both seaboats and Unmanned Surface Vessels, particularly important again in boarding operations but also to deploy the ARCIMS minehunting system. The mission bay should be sized to hold 20 ft ISO containers with appropriate power couplings for the PODS system. It may be optimal to have a carrier style lift connecting the mission bay and main deck (behind the UAV kennel and between the two hangers) however this is not essential and cost dependant. This would be augmented by a large boat bay, around 20 metres long - allowing it to hold a CB90 fast assault craft, adding masses of versatility.

            As in all modern ships, crew accommodation would be comfortable - especially important on ships which could be forward deployed for large amounts of the time. All crew would be accommodated in two or three man berths, each with it's own heads and shower. Crew amenities would be important morale boosters, with a large gym and mess areas. It is important that the ship has accommodation above the needs of the ships company, to allow extra personnel to be brought aboard for training, MCM operations and Royal Marine boarding teams.


The National Shipbuilding Strategy

            The National Shipbuilding Strategy is the document that governs the procurement and operation of all of HM (and devolved) Governments' ships - the Royal Navy being the largest part of this. It aims to ensure that British shipyards don't go through a 'feast or famine' as Barrow did before Astute production. One of the strategy's aims is to try and help secure export orders so that the MOD aren't the only customers for British shipbuilders. A steady drumbeat of fifteen corvettes and export orders, at one every year, could secure a UK shipyards future for a decade and a half.

            A corvette class, in service with the Royal Navy - a widely admired and respected Navy around the world, available for export would surely help with that. With a British order of 15, economies of scale could be realised and ships would be cheaper - both for us and partner nations. A corvette or light frigate would be very attractive to many small or medium sized green water navies, many of which lack home-grown shipbuilding capabilities. With the inherent flexibility my design offers, it would be especially palatable to the numerous small Pacific and Caribbean island nations which often wish to project power in the region in levels which need more force than an OPV but cannot afford a full blown frigate. The Royal Navy could even provide training on the type and if forward deployed, could even share and help develop support and logistics facilities.


An effective crew

            As outlined above, the Castle class would have a duel role, both as constabulary vessels but also operating in dangerous areas around the world. To enable the ships to remain at sea for as long as possible (perhaps nearly 300 days a year), they would need to be authorised a ships company larger than needed, allowing large portions of the crew to be on leave or attending courses. The Royal Navy currently has two distinct ways of allowing this, these being:
- Dual Crewing This is used in the Gulf on the deployed frigate and MCMVs. On the frigate (currently HMS Lancaster), the two whole crews rotate every four months during a port visit to HMS Jufair. The MCMV crews rotate after a build up period in UK waters on an identical ship.
-Three Watch Manning This is used on both the Batch One and Two Rivers, as well as the Hydrographic Squadron and is immensely popular with crews, who like the certainty of knowing in advance when they will be at sea. It essentially comprises a ships company of 1.5 times the size needed to crew the ship at any one time with crews swapping over during a transfer period (up to a week) at the end of the shift, which is at the Captains preference - usually 28 days on, 14 off but could also be 6 weeks/3 weeks or 8 weeks/4 weeks.

            While the Royal Navy is struggling to recruit and retain, they are also not utilising the 3,000 Royal Naval Reservists to their full potential. To help with this, and assist in dispersing the fleet to places where response times to any maritime threats around British waters, I would deploy five of the class to RNR establishments across the country (or nearby ports). These five ships would be crewed on the popular 3 Watch System but would, crucially, embark Reservists for 7 or 14 day training cruises several times a year as well as weekend training as often as possible - allowing the RNR to get to know the ship. Each of the five ships would be regionally aligned to a part of the United Kingdom (The Channel, West Coast Scotland/Northern Ireland, East Coast Scotland/North East England, East Anglia/London and Wales/ Western England) and would be named accordingly, to promote the Navy's local ties. The five RNR groups would then also be aligned to a larger region of the world (Atlantic, The Gulf, Indo-Pacific and Mediterranean) where two (four in the Gulf) corvettes would be deployed (named after a Castle near their aligned RNR units). They would be operated by a Duel Crew, as they would be operating more like traditional warships. Whenever crews needed extra manpower, their RNR units could be requested to send individual crew members out, being proficient at operating the class, having trained on an identical vessel over the long term.



Conclusion

            In conclusion, I believe that the Royal Navy should invest in a new class of multi role corvettes, for use in constabulary, patrol, counter piracy and maritime security taskings. If done properly, this class could provide a much needed boost to the British Shipbuilding industry as well as providing a benchmark for regular-reserve integration, all while providing a much needed boost in escort numbers.

Over to you, twitter.


BMR

God Save The King



P.S. For related articles I would suggest Think Defence's Ship that still isn't a frigate and Nick Drummond's piece on UK Land Power.


     



      


       







          

04 September 2022

More Horses Than Tanks

 More Horse Than Tanks

The Case For Public Duties

            It is an oft repeated statement that the British Army currently operates more horses than tanks. This is technically correct, if one discounts the Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (Tracked), the British Army will under Future Soldier operate 148 Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks and 485 horses, mainly under the Defence Animal Centre, Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment and King's Troop, Royal Horse Artillery but also, of course, Corporal Cruachan IV of the Royal Regiment of Scotland and finally the famous ceremonial duty haters, The Parachute Regiment, outsource their Public duties to Pegasus (a pony who unfortunately can't fly). In this article I'm going to argue that all of this is necessary for armed forces to both maintain the support of the public and recruit well.



            Firstly, while public duties obviously have limited military value on the face of it, the British military's recruiting is probably at an all time low. With operations constantly deployed at a near brigade level in Afghanistan and Iraq drawing to a close, large scale State Ceremonial and Public Duties (SCPD) will probably be some of the only times the Armed Forces get some publicity and awareness besides Remembrance Day (not great for recruiting) and when a ship breaks down/3 PARA has an orgy/racist recruiting policy. Trooping the Colour or the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo are excellent ambassadors for the British Armed Forces to both our own people and the world.

            Included in this point are indeed the horses, ponies, sheep, rams, Irish Wolfhounds and otterhounds of the British Army; while it is unlikely that the Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment are going to be leading a cavalry charge against a battalion of T-72 MBTs, their mounted band and horses act as ambassadors for the British Army and Global Britain. The same goes for the regimental mascots, Corporal Cruachan IV spreads awareness of his Regiment both through public engagements, meeting veterans and small children alike, and online, where the corporal has 2,700 followers on twitter (the obvious gauge for how effective the army is).

            However, it could also be argued that state ceremonial and public duties has a detrimental effect on a battalions morale and potentially manpower- this is often quoted as the reason all public duties should be abandoned completely and the Army should do nothing but run around Salisbury Plain with a knife between every soldiers jaw. However, blaming public duties for this could well be unfair. If you read the most recent manning liabilities for infantry battalions, you will recognise that some of the most understrength battalions are from the Royal Regiment of Scotland, Royal Welsh and Royal Irish. This suggests that the recruitment difficulties may in fact be due to them all having smaller pools who also tend to dislike the UK more than in England. This is also backed up by the fact that the Grenadier and Coldstream Guards, which both recruit in England, are some of the best recruited regiments in the infantry.

            Another of the main lines against the British Army's ceremonial role is to say something along the lines of, 'The French/Americans/Australians manage without horses/massed bands/ceremonial duties teams'. Not only is this a rather stupid way to think about it (other countries have other priorities), it is also demonstrably incorrect. The French Republican Guard have both horses and a mounted band while the US Armed Forces maintain over a hundred bands of various sizes and the ADF fields the Federation Guard. All this proves ceremonial duties form a part of the vast majority of countries armies; it would be deeply embarrassing for the United Kingdom to not have a band to play the national anthems during a State Visit.

            Finally, the killer of the Household Division itself. 'The British Army has more horses than tanks,' as I said in the introduction, this is indeed true, 148 Challengers to 485 horses. What this leaves out is that a horse is a lot cheaper than one of, if not the, most advanced Main Battle Tanks. The solution to this problem is not to dispose of the Army's horses, but to buy more tanks. Even if - against the advice of probably everyone in Main Building - the Defence Secretary decided to disband the Kings Troop, Royal Horse Artillery and Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment, selling all their horses he would soon find himself the funds for a massive increase in the Royal Armoured Corps.

            A well trained Irish Draught horse (which is the breed most commonly used by the British Army) seems to sell for around £15,000 (remember market forces and supply and demand would probably actually decrease this quite a bit if 500 extra horses went up for sale) and the Army owns 485 meaning the MOD would potentially make around £7,275,000 from their disposal. When they were procured in 1993, a Challenger 2 MBT cost £4,217,000 which, adjusted for inflation, is £7,328,661.48 in today money. This means for the loss of every horse in the army we could nearly have one more tank!

            Hopefully, you will be able to see now that, while indeed an extra role for the infantry, public duties don't actually affect the Field Army that much, seen as the 'cap badge mafia' seem to prize cap badges and kilts more than the deployability of the force, leaving us in the unusual predicament of having a lot more infantry battalions than supporting arms. Why then does it matter, if these infantry battalions occupy themselves with an activity, helping show Britain and her army off in the best possible light to the world, instead of sitting in barracks in Catterick since they can't deploy without signallers? 

Over to you twitter!

BMR  

God Save The Queen

            

16 August 2022

Per Mar, Per Terram

 Per Mare, Per Terram

Amphibious Forces for the Future


HMS Albion leading a multi-national amphibious force


            The Amphibious Force is often seen as one of the pillars of British maritime power; along with Carrier Strike and Trident. But with the ever-dreaded defence reviews seemingly never ending, amphibious capabilities are usually the first to go- the Navy has too much pride to get rid of the Carriers and scrapping the deterrent would have disastrous effects on the United Kingdom's global standing. This leaves only the Bootnecks left to cut for major savings. In this article, I'm going to propose a future force amphibious force that shares the burden of amphibious operations between all three services but still leaves us with a truly world class commando force.

Note: For a more comprehensive overview of Britain's future amphibious forces see my series Owning The Littorals


The Current Commandos

            Currently, the Royal Marines 'Commando' units (battalion equivalent) are commanded centrally by 3 Commando Brigade (3 CDO BDE). While technically forming a brigade, the Commando forces don't have enough combat or combat support units to operate as such, with 3 CDO BDE ssentially acting as a deployable HQ in a maritime environment. Under the brigade comes the Commandos, the fighting power of the Corps of Royal Marines.


            Two of the brigades Commandos follow the Commando 21 Structure, these being 40 CDO (forty commando) and 45 CDO (four-five commando). They consist of 6 companies- Command, Logistics and two each of close combat and stand off. The Command Company encompasses HQ functions for the CDO (through both the Main and Tactical HQs), the recce troop and sniper section, the Mortar troop (9 81mm mortars and 4 Fire Control Parties), Anti-tank troop (6 Javelin ATGMs), Heavy Machine Gun troop (6 .50 Calibre HMGs) and the signals troop. The Logistics troop commands all the 'rear echelon' parts of the unit; the 'A echelon', Forward Repair Team, Regimental Aid Post and 'B echelon'.
The commando 21 structure


The two Close Combat Companies provide the bayonet strength to the Commando and are made up of 5 officers and 98 other ranks divided into Company Headquarters and three rifle troops. Each troop consists of a manoeuvre support section (GPMG, Long Range Large Calibre Rifle and formerly a light mortar) and three rifle sections (2 four man fire teams and corporal in command) as well as a small troop HQ. This is complemented by a Fire Support Group and Company Headquarters. The entire company is transported by Landing Craft and mechanised by legs Mk.1. Overall, the company is not too dissimilar to an army light infantry company.

The two Stand Off Companies provide additional weapons support to the Commando, although they are capable of limited manoeuvre, and are made up of 5 officers and 78 other ranks. They consist of one close combat troop (identical to the three in the Close Combat Company, an Anti-Tank Troop (six Javelin ATGMs) and a Heavy Machine Gun Troop (six .50 calibre HMGs). One of the companies are wheeled using Jackal 2 MWMIK and one is tracked on Viking All-Terrain Vehicle (Protected).

 
           30 Commando information exploitation group (thirty commando IX) provide ISTAR support to the entire brigade. It is made up of 465 personnel (all ranks) and is named for 30 Assault Unit, a tri-service unit which gathered intelligence from behind enemy lines, whose organisation was planned heavily by Commander Ian Fleming (of Bond fame). The unit current organisation, however, is primarily Royal Marines and consists of four squadrons and HQ troop, who are responsible for unit administration. 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron (SR Sqn) provide the Brigade with its own organic recce capability. It has four troops; the Brigade Patrol Troop has six teams of four Marines who insert before the main force, scouting ahead in a similar style to UKSF units. Air Defence Troop operates Starstreak High velocity missiles to provide top cover to Brigade assets and the Royal Marine Police troop operate as force protection for Brigade HQ and provide  mentoring for partner nations. The squadron also has responsibility for Tactical Air Control Parties for the Brigade. Logistics Squadron provides Motor Transport, Catering, Stores, and Equipment support troops for Brigade on operations and at home while the Communications Squadron provides two satellite communications troops. This is rounded off by Y Squadron who provide electronic warfare assets to various levels of command.


            42 Commando are the 'specialist maritime operations unit' which means that they don't operate as a formed unit, instead deploying small, highly skilled teams around the world on Royal Navy warships and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries. Juliet Company are board and search specialists who board non-compliant vessels, mainly East of Suez and provide the Fleet Contingency Troop. Kilo Company are the Support, Augment, Liaison, Training (SALT) company, which means they provide teams to SALT other units (both UK and partner nations). Lima Company provide Joint Personnel Recovery on the Queen Elizabeth class carriers while Mike Company are force protection specialists for warships in high-risk areas.


            43 Commando Fleet Protection Group provides protection to the nuclear deterrent in and around HMNB Faslane and related establishments. The group is highly trained in maritime security, boarding operations and CBRN procedures. The unit numbers around 550 personnel and is divided between HQ Squadron, 3 rifle squadrons and the boat troop who operate three Island class patrol vessels, purchased of the Ministry of Defence Police and then up-armoured. The group also have a secondary role of assisting the Special Boat Service with Maritime Counter-Terrorism, especially in the North Sea Oil fields (although this is obviously a lower priority than protecting the deterrent).

 
           47 Commando provides landing craft support to the Royal Marines in the form of two squadrons of Landing Craft (4 Assault Squadron Royal Marines and 6 ASRM) both of which operate 4 Landing Craft Utility and 4 Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel. The Group also provides training to crews of the vessels and oversees training to partner nations in amphibious landings.They also command 539 Raiding Squadron RM who operate Landing Craft Air Cushions, LCVPs, Rigid Raiders and Offshore Raiding Craft directly under the command of the Brigade.


            The Commando Logistics Regiment provide Combat Service Support to the Brigade and draws its 780 personnel from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and British Army (all need to have passed the All-Arms Commando Course). They are split into HQ Squadron, Equipment Support Squadron (provide repair and recovery to the Brigades equipment), Logistics Support Squadron (provide transport, fuel and stores to the Brigade), Medical Squadron, Landing Force Support Squadron (land directly behind front line troops to control beach movements) and the Logistics Task Group which is essentially a high readiness smaller scale formation made up from all elements of the Regiment, to support the high-readiness Battlegroup.

Under the command of the CLR is the Viking Squadron, which operates the Royal Marines BvS10 All Terrain Vehicle (Protected). The Squadron is manned by 162 Marines and is split into four independent troops of 16 vehicles each. Two of the troops are held at 5 days notice to move with the lead Commando group with the remainder of the squadron held at 28 days notice to move.

 
           24 Commando provides engineering support to the Brigade and is manned by 492 British Army personnel who have completed the All-Arms Commando Course. The Regiment is made up of four squadrons: 56 HQ and support squadron who provide HQ functions and recce, support and signals troops. 54 Squadron provide engineering support to the Brigade during amphibious assaults and 59 squadron is the Naval Support Squadron. These are all supported by 131 (Reserve) Squadron based in London.

 
           29 Commando provide indirect fires to the Brigade, both through their own guns and as fire controllers. It consists of HQ battery, two gun batteries of 6 L118 light guns and three observation posts,a Naval Gunfire Support Forward Observation (NGSFO) Battery with eight 6 man fire support teams and a training battery.

 
           The Commando Helicopter Force consists of 3 squadrons of helicopters of the Fleet Air Arm, operating in support of 3 Commando Brigade. 845 NAS operates 3 flights of four Merlin Mk4 transport helicopters while 846 NAS operates one deployable flight, the Merlin OCU and the Maritime Counter Terrorism Flight. They are supported by 847 NAS with 6 Wildcat AH1 Helicopters. These can be augmented by any other rotary and fixed wing assets in the British Forces and our allies; namely Apache, Puma, Chinook and USMC V22 Ospreys.


Current Shipping

            Along with the Marines themselves, the Navy's amphibious ships are vitally important to a littoral theatre entry. Without them it would be literally impossible to invade anywhere bar the Isle of Wight. In this section of the article I'm going to detail the Navy and RFA's current amphibious shipping.


            The Royal Navy currently operates two Albion class Landing Platform Docks or LPDs- Albion and Bulwark. They displace 19,500 tons and are 176 metres long. Each is crewed by 325 officers and ratings and can reach speeds of 18 knots with a range of 8,000 miles. The ships have a two spot flight deck capable of landing helicopters up to the size of a Chinook but lack a hanger. Each operates a landing craft squadron of 4 LCU and 4 LCVP from davits and the large well deck. An Embarked Military Force of 405 (710 overload) can be carried along with 67 vehicles.


            Operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the Bay class are meant to bring in 'second wave' troops in any major landings. They can carry 356 troops (700 overload) with 1,150 lane metres for vehicles. The ships complement is 70 RFA all ranks. Although their primary role is amphibious assault, the Bays are often seen operating as mine countermeasures command and support ships in the Gulf or disaster relief in the Caribbean. They have a Chinook sized flight deck and no hanger, although the effects of this are mitigated by the installation of a temporary fabric hanger.


            The four Point class strategic sealift ships are owned and operated by Foreland Shipping Ltd and permanently chartered to the MOD. They are crewed by around 20 British Merchant Navy Men, who are also Royal Naval Reservists. They can transport up to 130 armoured vehicles or four helicopters at a speed of 21 knots but have no passenger capability to speak of. They aren't usually used in the assault phase of an operation, instead providing follow on equipment. Most of the time however, the Point class are used to transport equipment between standing garrisons (the Falklands, Cyprus, Germany etc.).


Future Amphibious Forces

            The Future Commando Force is a programme designed to essentially take the Royal Marines 'back to their roots' of amphibious raiding from the sea, like the original army commandos of World War 2, rather than acting in a role practically identical to any number of light role infantry battalions the army is not lacking, to say the least. This includes trials with different unit sizes, including troops of sixteen and sections of twelve and new technology, drones and unmanned ground vehicles. They also tested out new vehicles, such as the Polaris MRZR which is both air-portable by Merlin and incredibly ally and gave every marine a tablet as part of the ATAK (Android Team Awareness Kit) system; essentially kit which can be used for displaying data from UAVs and providing a location of friendly forces, greatly improving situational awareness both for the man on the ground and in HQs at every level from section to Northwood. The trials also included more symbolic changes including adopting the White Ensign instead of Union Flag on the Marines' left arm, adopting a separate uniform from the Army and the adoption of the Colt Canada C8 rifle instead of the SA80 as the primary individual rifle.

LRG organisation (Image credit: Navy Lookout)


The aim of the FCF is to deploy the Marines permanently aboard ships in 'Littoral Response Groups'. Two will be formed; LRG(North), based in the UK and responsible for the Atlantic, Baltic, Mediterranean and the Arctic and LRG(South), responsible for the Persian Gulf and Indo-Pacific which will be permanently based at the UK Joint Logistics Support base in Oman. LRG(N) will be made up of an Albion class LPD, Bay class LSD (plus escorts) and a Littoral Strike Unit consisting of a company group from 45 CDO and various supports from the brigade level. LRG(S), however, won't have the luxury of the LPD and LSD so will have to make do with a refurbished RFA Albion, but will, ironically have better aviation support from a fifty year old former container ship then LRG(N) will from two modern(ish) purpose built warships.


Fantasy Fleet Time!

            Now we have the context behind the current structure and theory of the Future Commando Force, I'm going to have a crack at my own fantasy amphibious force. I'm going to try and stay just about within the realms of reality budget-wise(ish!), and try and follow the doctrine of the Future Commando Force. This means that I'm going to expand on the ideas the theory is built around namely forward-deployed, light, expeditionary troops able to operate in independent company groups, away from any support not organic to the group.

 
           In keeping with the FCF plans, I would still forward deploy Groups both to the Gulf/Indo-Pacific region and the High North. Each group would be made up of a 'Littoral Strike Unit' of around 250 Marines from 45 Commando in the North and 40 Commando in the South and supporting units, half an infantry Battlegroup, a Landing Craft and vehicle squadron from 47 Commando, an aviation group from the Commando Helicopter Force, a Type 83 Destroyer, Type 26 frigate, Landing Helicopter Dock and a Littoral Strike Ship. This would all come together to form a well-rounded group optimised for raiding and small scale insertions which is entirely self contained. The exact composition of small units will obviously need perfecting with trials and experimentation (which has already began with the LRG[X] deployment) but should be reasonably easy to work with.


            I'm going to start with the simplest part and talk about the naval component of the group, which will be made up of a Type 26 frigate and Type 83 destroyer. The combination of the two gives the task force a potent and organic ASW, AAW and ASuW capability. Currently, the Type 32 frigate is expected to provide support to the LRGs but I would use them to provide depth to the forward deployed Type 31s.

The Littoral Strike Ship probably deserves it's own article but, in essence should be a part of the Multi Role Support Ship as it currently is pencilled in to be. Currently, the MRSS is going to be six ships to replace the Bays, Albion and Argus. I would however, change the programme fundamentally to be not a group of identical ships to instead being a group of ships will the same hull, engines and systems. They will be based on whichever design wins the Fleet Solid Support Ship competition and will have up to twelve hulls; four FSSS, four LSS and four Hospital ships (funded by the DFiD) plus whatever export orders we can secure. As I said earlier, I'm going to write an article about this proposal sometime in the near future but for now, I'll outline the LSS variant. 

The LSS should be based on the FSS (probably Team UK's proposal) meaning it will be 220 metres long, 30 metres wide and have a draught of 7 metres. There would be space for a two spot flight deck at around the same height as the top of the hanger in the image which would stretch roughly to the funnels (which would be heightened to the same level as the main superstructure). The large hanger would sit between the funnels and the location where RASCO is (although that would be deleted), just forward of this would be a large opening on both port and starboard so the LSS can operate in a similar fashion as the US Navy's Expeditionary Dock, moving cargo and vehicles between strategic RO-RO ships (in our case the Point class but could well be allied shipping or STUFT) and landing craft. This would be connected to a stern ramp for RO-RO and several decks for vehicle movement and stowage. To top this all off, would be the three decks seen, extended all the way aft for accommodation for embarked forces.

Team UK's FSS proposal

To round off the group is the flagship of the force, a Commando Carrier. This will be a similar size to the Juan Carlos class (or Canberra class if we feel AUKUSy today) Landing Helicopter Dock but I have brought back the term for the Centaur class because they will both literally carry Commandos and operate fixed wing aviation plus it sounds way more impressive. The class would have a flat top capable of operating F35B Lightnings as well as rotary aviation. A well deck for amphibious shipping would back onto the vehicle deck and an aircraft hanger would be necessary.


            The LRG is provided with a capable air group of one squadron of 12 F35Bs (primarily for CAP over the naval element- if anything else is needed then a Carrier Strike Group should be added), four Chinooks if they can be marinised, eight Merlin HC4s and eight Apache attack helicopters as well as the escorts own organic aviation assets. This would be augmented by UAVs when this technology has matured
properly.

 
           This may sound good but to land troops on the ground you need, well, troops on the ground. This will be provided by 40/45 Commando Royal Marines, but these will only deploy smaller formations of around a company group size. Each would be made of three large troops with engineer, artillery (in the form of fires controllers) and medical support.

To provide mass to the Marines, I would reflag 1st Division as a more expeditionary focused organisation to provide a rapid reaction capability worldwide, making it a fully deployable division. It would take command of a variety of the Army (and Navy's) lighter brigades, including 3 Commando. The lighter RM raiding force would be augmented by a half-battalion (I would reorganise the Division's Infantry into a structure similar to Commando 21) of one Close Combat and one Stand Off Company and a small HQ/logistics element. This would be augmented by a Cavalry Squadron, artillery battery with 120mm Mortars, engineer troop, medical teams and an ISTAR squadron. The entire Battlegroup (or as much as feasibly possible within equipment constraints) would be mounted in MRV(P) which should really only be a single vehicle instead of the several different packages currently planned for (my favourite is Bushmaster but any will do) in LRG(S) and F-ATV(P) in LRG(N).

 
           A landing force is obviously useless stuck aboard a ship, they need a way to get from ship to shore-back in the old times, this would be done solely with landing craft. The US Marines tried to use aviation solely and then found that while this might work well in the assault phase of any landing, by the time the main forward elements have a solid foothold on the ground, aviation cannot keep up with demand (remember this is the USMC, who have much better rotary wing support than virtually our entire forces, never mind the CHF) so even they had to bring back small vessels. These are currently the LCVP Mk5 and LCU Mk10 for the Royal Marines and are both in essence evolved designs which wouldn't look out of place on Sword beach. This is not in itself a bad thing, but has it's drawbacks on the craft's speed- the LCU has a fully laden speed of 10 knots. I think both of these need replacing with completely new designs.

I would replace the Landing Craft Mark 5 with the CB90 or similar. It increases the speed over the LCVP from 25 knots up to 40. The craft is a flexible and well proven design and can be armed with a variety of weapons systems including but not limited to M2HB HMGs and Grenade Machine Guns. This could, of course, all be adapted to suit the raiding teams needs and whatever equipment becomes available in the future. One of the potential downsides of the CB90 (aside from the price tag) is the smaller load (only 21 fully loaded troops to the LCVP's 35) and the CB90 cannot carry vehicles, although as 'light vehicles' get bigger and much heavier the LCVP can't carry much more than a Land Rover anyway.

The LCU should be replaced by a large hovercraft. This would be similar to the type used by the USMC rather than the in service (or recently retired?) type used by 47 Commando. Hovercraft have the advantage of being able to access up to 70% of coastlines around the world (compared to 15% for conventional landing craft) as well as not needing complicated wet docks to be launched from ships, instead essentially just needing an opening to drive straight out of. 

 
           That, with some investment, leaves us with a credible, modern and agile amphibious force, fit for any expeditionary warfare around the globe at many scales. Imagine, for a moment, a terrorist group seizing power in a small West African country. LRG(South) steams towards the nation immediately, with her embarked forces preparing. The group gets within ten miles of the coastline, launching her landing craft and helicopters laden with Marines and soldiers. A company, 1 LOAMSHIRES form a secure perimeter around the beach zone where the Hovercraft came ashore, allowing British citizens to be safely and efficiently evacuated to the ships, where medical and humanitarian attention is waiting. Meanwhile, the commandos head towards the British embassy, where sensitive material is destroyed and the entire staff evacuated by helicopter before the entire force pulls out, mere hours after the evacuation began.

Now think to the Falkland Islands, where by some strange course of events the Argentinians have managed to land a force and secure Mount Pleasant before reinforcements can arrive. Both LRGs head for the South Atlantic, having been reinforced by the rest of the battalions on amphibious duties at the time, as well as the two battalions with the most recent amphibious experience, forming an ad-hoc brigade under 3 CDO BDE HQ. The deployed Carrier Strike Group head towards the islands too, with the 'building up' group making preparations to sail immediately. The group lands first wave forces near Bluff cove, being followed up by troops brought down on ship taken up from trade and then transferred (with all their equipment) through the LSS' onto landing craft in preparation for the final push on Stanley. 

However unlikely, these examples show the main benefits of my proposal- it is scalable from company to brigade level and can deploy an entire amphibious brigade without having a committed amphibious brigade at high readiness at all times.